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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellees will rely upon the table of contents provided by Appellant in its appellate
brief and address the three topics delineated in "bold" type and designated as subsections
"A," "B," and "C" under the "Statement of Issue and Standards of Review" section of
Appellant's brief. Appellees assume that three subsections designated "A," "B," and "C"
are those central issues on appeal. The three subsections are: "Sykes Allowed to Slander
Hatch and make Himself a Hero," "Inappropriate Jury Instruction #19," and "Wrongful
Summary Judgment Granted Christiansen." [See Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-5].
1.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Appellee Dwane J.
Sykes to make certain statements as a pro se Defendant in the action.
Standard of Review: Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The determination by a trial court to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 of

the Utah Rules of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and will not
be overturned unless it is "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 633 East 640
North, 942 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40
(Utah 1992)).
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2.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Jury Instruction #19 to
be submitted to the jury.
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of a jury instruction presents a question of
law" which is reviewed for "correctness." State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 99 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) (citations omitted).

3.

The trial court did not err in granting William Christiansen's motion to
dismiss. Even if error was committed, William Christiansen's dismissal was
appropriate and did not affect the outcome of the case.
Standard of Review: The propriety of a dismissal based on Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) is a question of law and reviewed under a correctness standard. See
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 987 P.2d 602, 602 (Utah 1999). Furthermore,
"Jurisdictional questions are ... reviewed for correctness." State v. Finlayson, 2004
UT10,l[5,84P.3dll93.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February, 22, 2000, the trial court issued Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law

and Judgment in Civ. # 950400719. The case was tried before a jury in an eight day trial
from October 18 through October 22, 1999 and from October 25 through October 27,
1999. In response to the Special Verdict Form, the jury found in favor of
Appellee/Defendant Dwane Sykes (hereinafter, "Appellee Sykes") exonerating him of all
charges of fraudulent transfer, and improper influence. [See Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum "1"]. Appellant Hatch
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seeks review of five issues:
1. "The lax way in which the judge conducted the trial, allowing a tremendous
amount of irrelevant and immaterial testimony to come before the jury."
2. "Allowing a jury instruction [#19] to be included entitled 'Equity/ which
suggested that Hatch had come before the jury with 'unclean hands.'"
3. The trial court granting of Defendant William Christiansen's Motion to
Dismiss before he was served.
4. The award of attorney's fees to Defendant William Christiansen on his Motion
to Dismiss.
5. Rule 11 Sanctions granted against Appellant Hatch on motion by Defendant
William Christiansen. [See Appellant's Brief, pp. 40-41].
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The litigation underlying the present appeal is long and tortuous and involves
multiple lawsuits. For brevity's sake, Appellees will reiterate only the main historical
facts relevant to this appeal:
1. Appellant Hatch and Appellee Sykes entered into an option agreement in June
1974 whereby Appellant Hatch would sell his home and property located at
1511 South Carterville Road in Orem, Utah.
2. After Appellee Sykes obtained title to the aforementioned property, a legal
dispute arose between the two men.
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3. Several lawsuits were filed in the Fourth District Court of Utah County (Civ.#
57,125, Civ. # 57,127 and Civ. # 63,695), which suits were later consolidated
into one suit (Civ. # 8120457127).
4. On February 6, 1995, Appellant Hatch obtained a judgment against Appellee
Sykes for $509,942.03, which amount was reduced by the court to $141,693.52
on a motion for reconsideration.
5. On appeal, this Court remanded the case to the trial court, resulting in a final
judgment of $260,000.00.
6. A further aspect of this earlier litigation is important as it relates to William
Christiansen.
7. William Christiansen was named a defendant in the earlier suits that were later
consolidated into Civ. # 8120457127.
8. Even before consolidation of the three suits had occurred, trial court Judge
Mower had dismissed William Christiansen as a party. [See April 17, 1991
Order, attached hereto as Addendum "2"].
9. In fact, Judge Mower granted William Christiansen attorney's fees in that same
April 17, 1991 Order because the plaintiffs (including Appellant Hatch) failed
to notify the parties and the court of the filing and dismissal of their
bankruptcy.
10. After the three older lawsuits were consolidated into one suit (Civ. #
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8120457127), Judge Mower was again compelled to issue an Order against
Appellant Hatch because Mr. Hatch had attempted to sell William
Christiansen's property by sheriffs sale even though the court had previously
dismissed William Christiansen from the underlying litigation. [See July 5,
1995 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "3"].
11. In the July 5, 1995 Order, Judge Mower explained that the sheriffs sale was
"not supported by the requisite order" from any court of "competent
jurisdiction" and that any claim against William Christiansen was "barred by
the doctrine of 'res judicata."' [See July 5, 1995 Order, pp. 1-2].
12. The trial court, again, granted William Christiansen attorney's fees because
Appellant Hatch had made a "frivolous" attempt to attach Mr. Christiansen's
property. [See July 5, 1995 Order, pp. 1-2].
13.Unfortunately, the problems involving William Christiansen, were not laid to
rest.
14. On November 30, 1995, Appellant Hatch filed a subsequent suit (Civ.#
950400719, which forms the basis of this appeal) to enforce the $260,000.00
judgment he had obtained against Appellee Sykes in the earlier consolidated
suit.
15. The November 30, 1995 Complaint charged Appellee Sykes with the fraudulent
transfer of certain assets and real property in order to avoid paying the earlier
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judgment obtained by Appellant Hatch. Appellant also charged Appellee Sykes
with exercising improper influence over trusts, trustees, and trust assets. [See
Complaint, attached hereto as Addendum "4"].
16. When Appellant first filed his Complaint in the aforementioned suit on
November 30, 1995, William Christiansen was not named a defendant in the
action.
17. Presumably, Appellant Hatch did not name William Christiansen in the
November 30, 1995 because he knew better than to involve Mr. Christiansen
after the trial court, in previous litigation involving the same transactions, had
upheld Mr. Christiansen's dismissal and had penalized Appellant Hatch for
trying to attach Mr. Christiansen's property after the dismissal.
18. Surprisingly, when Appellant Hatch filed an Amended Complaint on August 27,
1996, Mr. Christiansen was, once again, named as a defendant. [See Amended
Complaint, attached hereto as Addendum "5"].
19. William Christiansen's attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting
memorandum. [See Motion to Dismiss Claims Against William Christiansen
and Memorandum in Support, attached hereto as Addendum "6"].
20. In the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Christiansen, through counsel, again asserts res
judicata and statute of limitations as bases for dismissal.
21. Mr. Christiansen also requested attorney's fees and sanctions to be assessed
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against Appellant Hatch in the Motion to Dismiss.
22. In response, Appellant Hatch answered that Mr. Christiansen had not yet been
served, and therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear Mr.
Christiansen's Motion to Dismiss. [See Plaintiffs Response Reply to
Christiansen Motion to Dismiss Claim and Counterclaim; and Plaintiffs
Motion for Dismissal and/or Removal Christiansen as a Named Party
Defendant, pp. 1,5, attached hereto as Addendum "7"].
23. It is highly significant that Appellant Hatch's motion also includes a "Motion
for Dismissal and/or Removal [sic] Christiansen as a Named Party Defendant."
24. In Appellant Hatch's response, he notes that "Plaintiff [Appellant Hatch] has no
problem with the idea that Christiansen should not be served in this matter and
that if necessary, his name may be removed from the heading of the amended
complaint." [See Plaintiffs Response Reply, p. 4].
25. In his response, Appellant Hatch also "moves this court for an order removing
the name of William Christiansen from the heading of the case, and if necessary
because of the voluntary answer filed by Christiansen, that the matter be
dismissed as to him." [See Plaintiffs Response Reply, p. 5].
26. Trial court Judge Eyre ultimately ordered that all claims against William
Christiansen be dismissed and awarded attorney's fees to Mr. Christiansen.
The trial court also reserved the right to award Rule 11 sanctions until the time
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that Mr. Christiansen's counterclaim was heard. [See Order for Dismissal of
Claims Against William Christiansen, attached hereto as Addendum "8"].
27. After a jury trial on October 20-21, 1999, the jury awarded Mr. Christiansen
$1,000.00 in compensatory damages for Appellant Hatch's abuse of civil
process. [See August 7, 1999 Judgment and Order, attached hereto as
Addendum "9"].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Appellee Sykes to make
certain statements and introduce two documents during the course of litigation. On the
contrary, the trial court exercised proper and direct control over the proceedings and
instructed the jury appropriately as to the law and the testimony offered during trial.
Appellee Sykes represented himself in the matter. The trial court set clear parameters for
Sykes. Appellant's attorney failed to object to many of Appellee Sykes' statements.
Furthermore, any statements by Sykes that were admitted over Appellant's objections
were harmless and did not prejudice the jury.
Jury instruction #19 was appropriate given the charges made by Appellant against
Appellee Sykes. The trial court deemed the case to involve issues of equity and therefore
allowed jury instruction #19 to be included. Even if jury instruction #19 was not entirely
appropo to the case, the balance of the jury instructions and the reception of evidence and
management of the trial by the trial court as well as closing arguments evidence that the
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parties received a fair trial and that the jury was not prejudiced by the sole "offending"
instruction.
By filing his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant William Christiansen acceded to the
jurisdiction of the trial court even though he was not served with the Amended Complaint.
Even if this Court determines that the trial court erred procedurally in granting the
Motion to Dismiss, Appellant subsequently, and of his own accord, motioned the trial
court to dismiss William Christiansen after receiving the Mr. Christiansen's Motion to
Dismiss. Defendant William Christiansen was dismissed and all parties agreed to the
dismissal. The only questions remaining, if any, are whether the trial court should have
granted attorney's fees to Mr. Christiansen on his Motion to Dismiss and whether
subsequent sanctions were appropriate.
ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Appellee Sykes to make
certain statements as a pro se Defendant in the action.
The determination by a trial court to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 of

the Utah Rules of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and will not
be overturned unless it is "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 633 East 640
North, 942 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40
(Utah 1992)).
"A trial court's rulings with regard to the admissibility of evidence are generally
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accorded substantial deference: c[t]rial courts have wide latitude in making determinations
of relevance, probativeness, and prejudice.'" Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 63
P.3d 686 (Utah 2002) (quoting State v. 633 East 640 North, 942 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah
1997)).
Appellant's first issue on appeal concerns statements made by Appellee Dwane
Sykes (who appeared pro se) during the course of trial. In his appellate brief, Appellant
relies primarily upon emotion-laden and generalized terms in arguing that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing Appellee Sykes to make certain statements during trial.
Appellant argues that, among other things, Appellee Dwane Sykes was allowed to:
"slander [Mr.] Hatch and make himself a hero," "make manifold irrelevant statements of
fact which was a great waste of the court's time and created confusion for the jury,"
"make numerous comments of a derogatory nature about [Mr. Hatch]," "go on endlessly
bragging about himself to bias the jury in his favor," "make prejudicial, inflammatory, or
slanderous statements," and to "make wild, untrue gratuitous accusations." [See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-12].
This sort of vague generalizing, however, does not prove that the trial court abused
its discretion. Appellant does provide a few specific examples of statements made by
Appellee Sykes during the trial that he deems prejudicial. Many of those statements, as
Appellant acknowledges, were made during Appellee Sykes opening statement. [See
Appellant's Brief, p. 10].
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While it is true that Appellant's counsel interposed several objections during
Appellee Sykes' opening statement, a review of Sykes' opening remarks and their
corresponding objections (as specifically cited by Appellant in its brief at p. 10) proves
that the trial court handled the objections appropriately, and that no prejudice resulted:
1. MR. SYKES: "To show that it [sic] intended fraud, he [Mr. Hatch] has to
show according to—he has to show that I made the conveyance without
receiving reasonable equivalent value, and that at the time I became insolvent as
a result of the transfers." MR. AMOTT: "I will place an objection on the
record. This is a misstatement of the law. It is incomplete, and inaccurate, and
confusing to the jury." THE COURT: "Le me advise the jury. I am going to
be advising you as to what the law is. I will be instructing you as to what the
law is, and I think what this attorney says isn't law. What Mr. Sykes says as his
own attorney is not evidence either. I think he will be swom. He will be asked
questions and he will be testifying. At that time you can consider it as evidence
. . .So, again, to the extent you hear any statements of what the law is, it is
inconsistent with what I instruct you. My instructions will be the law and you
are to follow my instructions, okay?" [See October 18, 1999 Transcript of
Proceedings, 6:11 through 7:8 (bate stamped 2469)]. 1
2. MR. AMOTT: "Do we have testimony here, or are we giving an opening
statement?" THE COURT: "Tell me, is this going to be evidence that your are
going to present?" MR SYKES: "This is what the evidence will show." THE
COURT: "All right. Go ahead." MR. SYKES: "The reasons for the lawsuit,
the evidence will show, is. . . ." [See October 18, 1999 Transcript of
Proceedings, 13:15-22 (bate stamped 2469)].
3. MR. AMOTT: "If he is going to testify again now—and also again, I am just
worrying about our time frame." THE COURT: "This should just be a very
brief outline of what you're going to present. If they are going to hear it in
evidence, you can argue at the close of trial." MR. SYKES: So we determined
1 The bate stamp number is provided because several of the transcripts are from
proceedings that occurred on the same day. Page number and line number (where
necessary for reference) shall be separated by a colon (i.e. 6:11 through 7:8 indicates that
the information is taken from page 6 at line 11 and continuing through page 7 at line 8).
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that the thing to do would be to donate the house into the trust, also." [See
October 18, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 14:16-22 (bate stamped 2469)].
4. MR. AMOTT: "I am going to object, your Honor. There has been again—he
is not only testifying not under oath, he is testifying about irrelevant things that
are not going to be in the trial." THE COURT: "How does this relate to the
matter that is before this Court and this jury." (Thereafter, the trial court, Mr.
Amott and Mr. Sykes discuss the relevance of the issue of title to a certain
parcel of property). THE COURT: "Yes. Just try to outline what you think the
evidence will show. Don't go into all of the details of all of the evidence now,
or we won't ever get through. But do tell us that he had a piece of property and
just what you think the evidence will show, just briefly." [See October 18,
1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 16:11 through 18:16 (bate stamped 2469)].
Although a recitation of the foregoing testimony is laborious, such an exercise
clearly shows that the trial court acted appropriately in instructing the jury when
Appellant's counsel objected to certain statements made by Appellee Sykes. Moreover,
the trial court properly restricted Sykes when he began speaking too freely about irrelevant
subject matter during his opening arguments. Because Appellee Sykes represented
himself pro se, it is understandable that some objections would be made and that the trial
court would have to provide some guidance during trial. The record proves that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when handling certain objections made by Appellant.
On the contrary, the trial court instructed both the jury and Appellee Sykes as to the
requirements of the law, and advised Sykes to avoid belaboring irrelevant points.
Appellant also takes issue with certain statements made by Appellee Sykes about
his own health, and with negative statements made by Appellee Sykes against Appellant.
[See Appellant's Brief, p. 10]. Appellant does not inform this Court, however, that none
Page 12 of 27

of these particular statements were objected to. Nor does Appellant clarify the fact that
these statements were made during opening arguments.
Appellant lists another set of "inflammable and false statements" made by Appellee
Sykes during Sykes' direct examination by Mr. Amott. [See Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11].
However, a review of the trial transcript shows that Mr. Amott did not object to any of
these alleged "inflammable and false statements" at the time they were made.
In Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc^ 68 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Utah App. 2003),
this Court advised:
"Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to
the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if
appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856P.2d358, 361 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (quoting
VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mack Distrib., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988)). "This specificity requirement arises out of the trial court's need
to assess allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the
context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue." Id. "The 'mere mention'
of an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority
does not preserve that issue for appeal." Id (quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v.
Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct.App. 1991)). "[F]or an issue to be
sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." Id. (quotations and
citations omitted).
Because Mr. Amott did not object to the allegedly offensive statements, Appellant
cannot now assert that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the statements to
stand at trial. Appellant did not preserve its right to have this Court review the statements
in question, and did not allow the trial court to rule on the relevancy of the statements in
the first instance. It is worth noting that Appellant acknowledges that "Hatch's attorney
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failed on many occasions to [object] out of fear of offending the trial court and in the
interests of time." [See Appellant's Brief, p. 9].
Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
"Orem City" letter and "Explorers Club of New York City" article to be included as
exhibits at trial. [See Appellant's Brief, p. 12 and 14].
During testimony, Appellee Sykes referred to a letter dated February 11, 1981 from
Orem City to Appellanl Hatch in relation to the "Ragozzine" property. Appellant's
attorney, Mr. Amott, objected to inclusion of the letter and any testimony related thereto
as "irrelevant." [See October 25, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 5:18 through 6:24 (bate
stamped 2473)]. The trial court then explained to Sykes that his testimony must be
focused on "relevant information, evidence, testimony" concerning the trusts at issue in
the litigation. [See October 25, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 7:7-15 (bate stamped
2473)].
Thereafter, the trial court allowed both Mr. Ludlow (who represented the Sykes
Trust) and Mr. Amott to voir dire Appellee Sykes. During the course of the voir dire,
Sykes explained why the parcel in issue was included in a particular trust. At the
conclusion of the voir dire, the trial court ruled that the Orem City letter was relevant to
the charges raised in the case (i.e. fraudulent conveyance) and allowed the letter to be
included. [See October 25, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 8:2 through 13:10 (bate
stamped 2473)]. Because the Orem City letter served as a partial explanation for why
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Sykes transferred the "Ragozzine" property into the trust, the letter was relevant to Sykes5
defense as to the charge of fraudulent conveyance. The trial court ruled correctly in
admitting the letter.
As to the "Explorers Club of New York City" article, Mr. Amott objected to its
inclusion on the basis of relevance. The trial court ruled that although page 1 of the
article was hearsay, page 2 was relevant as to the establishment of an insurance policy by
Appellee Sykes, and as an explanation for why Sykes set up trusts. [See October 25, 1999
Transcript of Proceedings, 40:19 through 44:8 (bate stamped 2473)]. Again, these facts
were relevant to Appellee Sykes' defense as to why he established certain trusts.
Most importantly, Appellant offers no cognizable argument on appeal against the
inclusion of either the Orem City letter or the "Explorers Club of New York City" article
as evidence during trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these to
documents to be introduced for evidentiary purposes.
Even if this Court were to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting certain statements to be made during trial, or that the letter and article should
not have been introduced on evidentiary grounds, Appellant must still establish that the
error affected the outcome of the case. "If the error was harmless, that is, if the error was
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the
outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order." Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251,
1255 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997)).
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Appellant cannot prove that any alleged errors affected the outcome of the case.
Therefore, Appellant's qualms over "fairness" of the trial remain unproven.
2.

The trial court did not err in allowing Jury Instruction #19 to be submitted to
the jury.
"A trial court's ruling concerning a jury instruction is reviewed for correctness. A

new trial will not be granted unless any error of the trial court was prejudicial, meaning
that it misadvised or misled the jury on the law." Butler v. Naylor, 987 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah
1999) (citations omitted).
In Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991), this Court considered
whether a jury instruction on the tax consequences of a damage award was sufficiently
prejudicial so as to affect the outcome of the damage award. This Court specifically
considered the context in which the objectionable jury instruction was presented by
referencing the other jury instructions given at the same time. Id. at 1230. After
consideration, this Court determined that the objectionable jury instruction did not affect
the outcome of the damages awarded. Id.
In Cheves v. Williams, 993 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court
provided clear guidelines for appellate courts who are asked to review the propriety of a
jury instruction:
In reviewing a jury instruction, we consider the challenged instruction in
context. "As we have repeatedly held, if the jury instructions as a whole fairly
instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error does not arise merely
because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have
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been." Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474,478 (Utah 1999)
(quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 1996)) (other citations
omitted).
Furthermore, an error injury instructions may be harmless where the error is
"'sufficiently inconsequential so that no reasonable likelihood exists that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" C T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479,
484 (Utah 1999) (quoting Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357,
360 (Utah 1997)); see also C T., 977 P.2d at 484 (stating that we review "all of
the jury instructions, the evidence, and closing arguments" to determine
whether "it is highly probable that the jury considered each of the relevant...
factors during their deliberations even though not specifically instructed to do
so"). Finally, we will not reverse for errors in jury instructions if the
complaining party "fail[s] to demonstrate how the court's refusal to adopt their
proposed jury instructions prejudiced them." Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil
Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1249 (Utah 1998).
The trial court in this case included twenty-eight jury instructions. [See Appellant's
brief, Addendum "B" for a copy of the jury instructions]. Appellant Hatch objects to the
inclusion of a single jury instruction (#19) concerning equity. Jury instruction #19
indicates: "A remedy of equity, and one who invokes it must have clean hands in having
done equity himself."
On October 26, 1999, the trial judge, the attorneys, and Appellee Sykes discussed
the equity/clean hands jury instruction #19. Sykes requested the inclusion of the
equity/unclean hands instruction. The trial judge indicated that he would consider
whether or not to include the instruction and notify the parties in the morning. [See
October 26, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, pp.3-4 (bate-stamped 002752)].
On October 27, 1999, the trial court reiterated that Plaintiffs (Appellant's)
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counsel, Mr. Amott, had objected to the inclusion of the equity instruction, but that the
court had decided to include the instruction despite the objection. [See October 26, 1999
Transcript of Proceedings, 3:17-20 (bate stamped 002753)]. Later in the proceeding,
Plaintiffs counsel explained that he objected to jury instruction #19 because the
instruction improperly focused the jury on the alleged behavior of Mr. Hatch, while the
real issue at trial concerned only a judgment that Mr. Hatch was attempting to collect.
[See October 26, 1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 22:13 through 23:10 (bate stamped
002753)].
Appellant recites the foregoing facts in its appellate brief. However, Appellant
does not mention that the trial court provided an explanation for its decision to allow jury
instruction #19 to be included. After Mr. Hatch's attorney objected to the inclusion of
jury instruction #19, the trial court explained:
Okay. I asked the question—I said, gee, is this a case of equity? And probably
the closest, it does sound in terms of rescission, rescission of trust agreements.

And rescission of the conveyances to the trust and the use by the trust of the
property. Rescission is an equitable claim and the case does sound in equity.
That's a very well understood and known axiom in the law. It means he who
does equity—he who seeks equity, must do equity and have clean hands.
I felt that counsel did a good job of arguing the points, as did Appellee Sykes.
It will always be a relevant thing for a trier of fact to consider in any claim for
equitable relief. So I gave it. It was requested and I gave it. [See October 26,
1999 Transcript of Proceedings, 24:3-18 (bate stamped 002753)].
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Appellant's claims in the "Amended Complaint/' filed on August 27, 1996 focus
on allegations that Appellee Sykes fraudulently transferred certain assets in order to avoid
paying an earlier judgment and that Appellee Sykes exercised improper influence over the
trustees, the trusts, and the assets of the trusts in an attempt to defraud creditors.
Appellant Hatch's primary request for relief was to have certain transfers set aside on the
basis of fraud. [See Amended Complaint, pp. 8-9].
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants/Appelles on all contested issues.
In response to the Special Verdict Form, the jury found that Appellee Sykes did not
fraudulently transfer any of his interest in the various properties with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Furthermore, the jury found that Appellee Sykes did
not exercise improper influence over the trusts, trustees, or trust assets with actual intent
to hinder, delay or defraud lawful creditors. [See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment].
There is no indication anywhere that the jury gave any undue consideration to jury
instruction #19, or that that jury instruction affected their decision to exonerate Sykes.
Appellant cannot muster any credible evidence from the record which suggests otherwise.
Appellant relies upon an argument that is logically flawed: namely, that because the jury
returned to him an unfavorable verdict, jury instruction #19 must have been the cause of
the unfavorable verdict. This argument is simply not supported by the underlying record.
When this Court considers "all of the jury instructions, the evidence, and closing
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arguments," in conjunction with the offending jury instruction #19, it is apparent that the
jury's finding in favor of Appellee Sykes was based upon the jury's belief that Sykes did
not engage in any acts of fraudulent transfer, with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors, and that Appellee Sykes did not exercise improper influence over the trusts,
trustees or trust assets. [See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pp. 1-2].
Jury instruction #2 clearly instructs the jury on Plaintiff s/Appellant's claims and
the legal bases for the claims. Furthermore, jury instruction #4 warns the jury that their
decision must be "based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion, or
prejudice." Jury instruction #7 directs the jury to disregard anything that the trial judge
may have said or done that might make the jury think that the judge believed one witness
over the other. Jury instruction #8 instructs the jury how to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses.
Together, these jury instructions correctly focus the deliberation process of the
jury, and "level the playing field" for all parties.
The jury instructions "as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law" in
this case. Furthermore, "reversible error does not arise merely because one jury
instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been." Even if this Court
finds that jury instruction #19 was somewhat overreaching or even inappropriate, the
evidence, the closing arguments, and the inclusion of the other balanced jury instructions
all militate against a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in adding jury
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instruction #19.
Finally, Appellant has not offered a modicum of proof that jury instruction #19
affected the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, this Court should find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by including jury instruction #19 and that, at any rate,
the outcome of the proceedings was unaffected by its inclusion.
3.

The trial court did not err in granting William Christiansen's motion to
dismiss; however, even if error was committed, William Christiansen's
dismissal was appropriate and did not affect the outcome of the case.
The propriety of a dismissal based on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law

and reviewed under a correctness standard. See Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 987 P.2d 602,
602 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, "Jurisdictional questions are ... reviewed for correctness."
State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10,1f 5, 84 P.3d 1193.
Appellant is correct in noting that Utah R. Civ. P. 4 requires service of a summons
in conformity with that rule in order for a court to obtain jurisdiction over a party. [See
Appellant's Brief, p. 28].
However, it is undisputed in this case that, although never served with a summons,
William Christiansen filed a motion to dismiss and counterclaim (for attorney's fees and
sanctions) with the trial court on November 21, 1996. By so doing, William Christiansen
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court even though he was never properly
served under the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 4.
There appears to be no case law directly on point in Utah that addresses the
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question of whether a court obtains jurisdiction over a defendant if that defendant is never
served with process in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 4, but the named defendant,
nonetheless, files a motion to dismiss in response to the complaint.
By analogy to the doctrine of "special appearances," however, it is reasonable to
argue that a court may obtain jurisdiction over a defendant that has not been served with a
summons by virtue of the defendant filing a motion to dismiss in response to the
complaint.
It is a widely established legal principle that a party who wishes to challenge the
jurisdiction of a court may do so by entering a "special appearance." Generally, a party
challenging jurisdiction must specifically argue against jurisdiction by making special
appearance but may not argue any other element or issue in the case. Such a limitation is
necessary so as to avoid conferring actual jurisdiction on the court before which the
argument is made. See generally, Barlow v. Capo, 821 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1991);
Guenther v. Guenther, 749 P.2d 628 (Utah 1988); Housley v. Anaconda Co., All P.2d
390 (Utah 1967); Silver City Mercantile Co. v. District Court of Utah County, 195 P. 194
(Utah 1920).
If a party who enters a special appearance in order to contest jurisdiction is
confined to arguing only the issue of jurisdiction in order to avoid conferring jurisdiction
on the court hearing the matter, then surely a defendant who files a motion to dismiss in
response to a complaint has acceded to the jurisdiction of the court, even if the defendant
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was never properly served with a summons pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4.
In the instant case, William Christiansen was obviously aware that he had been
named as a defendant in Appellant Hatch's Amended Complaint. In response, Mr.
Christiansen motioned the court for his own dismissal, which motion was granted. Such a
response demonstrated his willingness to grant the trial court the necessary jurisdiction to
decide the question. It would be an entirely different matter if William Christiansen had
not made any response to the complaint and proper service had never occurred. As it
stands, however, William Christiansen agreed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court so that the trial court could determine whether or not he was a properly named
party.
As noted in the "Statement of Facts" section of this brief, Appellant had already
attempted to involve William Christiansen in earlier litigation even after the court had
dismissed William Christiansen. On appeal, Appellant Hatch decries the fact that he was
compelled to pay Mr. Christiansen's attorney's fees and a $1,000.00 sanction fine.
Nevertheless, given Appellant's lack of caution in naming Mr. Christiansen as a
party, and an apparent willingness to contravene earlier court orders, the award of
attorney's fees and $1,000.00 fine to Christiansen is entirely justified given the prior
disposition of the court in earlier cases involving the same parties and issues.
Even if this Court finds that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Mr.
Christiansen's Motion to Dismiss and that the award of attorney's fees and sanction fines
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were inappropriate, the fact remains that Appellant conceded that William Christiansen
should not have been named as a defendant in the Amended Complaint. As explained in
the "Statement of Facts" section of this brief, Appellant's response to Mr. Christiansen's
Motion to Dismiss was partially denominated "Motion for Dismissal and/or Removal
Christiansen as a Named Party Defendant" and in the body of that response, Appellant
made motion upon the trial court to dismiss Mr. Christiansen or allow his name to be
removed from the pleadings. [See "Statement of Facts", ^ 22-25, supra].
Whatever might be said on the issue of jurisdiction, all parties agreed that the
dismissal of William Christiansen from the case was appropriate. In fact, Appellant does
not allege on appeal that the case suffered a defect because Mr. Christiansen was
dismissed. Appellant's argument is merely that the trial court's dismissal was not
procedurally appropriate because Mr. Christiansen had not been served.
This Court should find, under the "correctness" standard that the trial court did
obtain jurisdiction over William Christiansen at the time he filed a motion to dismiss even
though he was never served with a summons in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 4.
Moreover, this Court should sustain the award of attorney's fees and sanctions against
Appellant Hatch and in favor of Mr. Christiansen. Finally, even if this Court finds that the
trial court lacked proper jurisdiction over William Christiansen and that, accordingly, the
attorney's fees award sanction fines were inappropriate, this Court should affirm the
actual dismissal of William Christiansen from the case inasmuch as Appellant motioned
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the trial court for the dismissal.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Appellant has not met the legal standard for establishing "abuse of discretion" in
this case. The trial court, in dealing with a pro se defendant acted in accordance with the
rules of evidence. The trial court instructed the jury to receive only certain aspects of
Appellee Sykes testimony, and properly considered objections raised by Appellant's
attorney. Additionally, Appellant's attorney failed to object to many of the statements
offered by Appellee Sykes.
Jury instruction #19 was appropriate given the underlying claims and defenses of
the parties. Even if this Court finds jury instruction #19 to be inappropriate, this Court
should find that the trial court did not err in submitting the instruction because the
remaining jury instructions, evidence, and closing arguments provided a "level playing
field" for the parties and that inclusion of jury instruction #19 did not prejudice the jury or
alter the outcome of the case.
\
\
\
\
\
\
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The trial court properly obtained jurisdiction over William Christiansen because he
filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court. The attorney's fees and sanctions were
appropriate given the actions of the Appellant vis-a-vis Mr. Christiansen in previous
lawsuits. Mr. Christiansen's dismissal was appropriate and agreed to by Appellant.
Respectfully submitted this

(ff day of January, 2005.

^

S

T

^

^OOWCHEIDEMAN

Attorney for Appellees
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ADDENDUM 1

FILED
Fourth Ju^cl*! DUttk* Court

B- Kent Ludlow r USB No. 2010
P.O. Box 95827
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Telephone: (801) 254-1096
Attorney For The Trusts and Trustee

IKS THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Howard H- Hatch,
Plaintiffi

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT

vs.

Civil N o .

950400719

Dwane Sykes, et. al.,

Judge Guy R. Burningham
Defendants.

This case was tried before a jury in an eight day trial from
October 18 through October 22, 1999 and October 25 through October 27,
1999.

Plaintiff was represented b y Ralph C. Amott, Defendant Trusts and

Trustees were represented by B. Kent Ludlow, and Dwane Sykes represented
himself.

The jury having been duly instructed and polled at the request

of Plaintiff, found in favor of Defendants on all contested issues of
fact and more particularly found the following in response to the
Special Verdict Form:

1.

Defendant Sykes did not transfer his interest in the 3-25

acres of Carterville property by himself or others acting under his
control, to a trust, and/or others, with actual intent to hinder, delayr
or defraud creditors.
2,

Defendant Sykes did not transfer his interest in the Pleasant

Grove properties by himself or by others acting under his control, to a
trust, and/or others, with actual intent to hinder, defraud, or delay

creditors*
3.

Defendant Sykes did not transfer his interest in the Raggozine

property, the family home, by himself or by others acting under his
control, to a trust, and/or others, with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors.
4.

Defendant Sykes did not exercise such control over the

transfers of the Pierroti rental home, by others so as to be a
fraudulent conveyance done with actual intent to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors.
5 . Defendant Sykes did not exercise such improper influence or
control over the trusts, trustees, and trust assets transferred to and
in the trust with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud lawful
creditors of Mr. Sykes, making these transfers not fraudulent
conveyances.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The jury having found in favor of Defendants on all contested
issues of fact including those specifically set forth on the Special
Verdict Form, the Court concludes as follows:
1,

The 3.25 acres of Carterville Road property which is more

particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point on the east side of the
Carterville Road, which point is North 520.03 feet and
East 1381.56 feet from the West quarter corner of Section
25, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence North 3° 05T East along fence and
Carterville Road 151,25 feet; thence North 74° 46V East
130.92 feet to the center line of an existing road;
thence North 64° 03f East 54,05 feet; thence South 85°
12' East 48.11 feet; thence South 36° 26 ! East 92.31
feet; thence leaving the center line of the existing
road; thence South 90.80 feet; thence East 160.00 feet;
thence North 96.92 feet; thence East 157,74 feet; thence
South 16° 38' East 56.14 feet; thence South 6g 561 West
70.89 feet; thence South 24° 42f East 148.45 feet; thence
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North 82° 53f West 195.33 feet along a fence; thence
South 6° 16f West 41-96 feet along a fence; thence North
82° 42 f West 305.94 feet along a fence; thence North 88°
03f West 33.77 feet along a fence to J. Theron Smith
property; thence North 2° 12f East 90.00 feet along fence
and said property line; thence North 85° 18T West along a
fence and property line 142.00 feet to beginning and to
the Carterville Road,
was not Fraudulently Conveyed by Dwane Sykes under any applicable laws
of the State of Utah and is not subject to any claims of Plaintiff and
may not be attached, executed upon or otherwise interfered with in any
manner by Plaintiff.
2.

The Raggozine property which is more particularly described as

follows:
Commencing at a point North 620.0 feet and East 1667.4
feet from the West quarter corner of Section 25, T6S, R2E,
SLB&M; thence North 76 feet; thence East 160 feet; thence
South 136 feet; thence West 160 feet; thence North 60 feet to
the point of beginning.
was not Fraudulently Conveyed by Dvane Sykes under any applicable laws
of the State of Utah and is not subject to any claims of Plaintiff and
may not be attached, executed upon or otherwise interfered with in any
manner by Plaintiff.
3.

The Pleasant Grove properties which are more particularly

described as follows:
Parcel 1:
Commencing 8,47 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot
3, Block 36, Plat "A", Pleasant Grove City Survey; thence East
195.78 feet; thence South 200 feet; thence West 200.38 feet;
thence South l g 19 ! West 12.4 feet; thence North 89° 25f West
153.05 feet; thence North 0° 10' West 212.41 feet; thence
South 89° 22' East 88,5 feet; thence South 1° 19' West 100
feet; thence South 89° 22' East 70 feet; thence North 100 feet
to the point of beginning.
Parcel 2;
Commencing 149.16 feet West of the Northeast corner of
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Lot 4, Block 36, Plat "A", Pleasant Grove city Survey of
Building Lots; thence West 43,34 feet; thence South 130.0
feet; thence East 43.34 feet; thence North 130,0 feet to place
of beginning.
were not Fraudulently Conveyed by Dwane Sykes under any applicable laws
of the State of Utah and are not subject to any claims of Plaintiff and
may not be attached, executed upon or otherwise interfered with in any
manner by Plaintiff.
4.

The Pierroti property which is more particularly described as

follows:
Beginning at a point on the corner on the East edge of
Carterville Road and on the South edge of Hope Lane, which
point is North 884.66 feet and East 1,403.79 feet, more or
less, from the West quarter corner of Section 25, Township 6
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South
84° 10V East 100 feet along a hedge and fence on the South
side of Hope Lane; thence South 3° 05f West 70 feet; thence
North 84° 10V West 100 feet to the East edge of Carterville
Road; thence North 3° 051 East 70 feet along the East side of
Carterville Road to the point of beginning.
was not Fraudulently Conveyed by Dwane Sykes under any applicable laws
of the State of Utah and is not subject to any claims of Plaintiff and
may not be attached, executed upon or otherwise interfered with in any
manner by Plaintiff.
JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs Complaint including, but not limited to all amendments
thereto, and all claims made therein against any of the Defendants are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this "2£L day of

P^S

f 20J%?.
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Approved as t o Form;
Dat*
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Date:
B. Kent Ludlotf, A t t o r n e y f o r
Defendant T r u s t s and T r u s t e e s
Date:
Dwrne SykesT"?FS"
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Approved as t o Form:
Date:
Ralph C. Amott, Attorney for
Plaintiff

Date:
B- Kent Ludlow, Attorney for
Defendant Trusts and Trustees
Date:

y
rJr;
f, £ » *
Dwane 6yK£s, 5p6 Se

ADDENDUM 2

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD F. HATCH, MARJORIE S.
HATCH AND UNIVERSITY AVENUE
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, A
Limited partnership,
Plaintiffs,

)

ORDER (long title,
below)
CIVIL NO. 63,695
Hon. David L. Mower

-vsZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
DWANE J« SYKES, VIRGINIA
FLYNN and WILLIAM
CHRISTIANSEN, d/b/a ARAPIAN
VALLEY LIVESTOCK CO.,
Defendants.

DWANE J. SYKES,
CIVIL NO. 57,125
Plaintiff,
-vsANTHONY RAGOZZINE and
RUTH RAGOZZINE,
Defendants.

DENNIS J. SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES,
ET AL.,
CIVIL NO, 57,127
Plaintiffs,
-VS-

HOWARD F. HATCH, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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Hatch et al. v. Zions et al*, Case number 63 f 695, 57,127 and
57,125r
Order on Mr, Christiansen's motions (1) to dismiss and (2) for
attorney's fees, Page -2ORDER ON MR. CHRISTIANSENS MOTIONS
(1) TO DISMISS AND (2) FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
Defendant Christiansen has asked the Court to dismiss any
claims against him and to award him some attorney's fees. The
court intends to grant the requests.
First, I will analyze the situation in light of the motion
to dismiss*
ANALYSIS IN RE MOTION TO DISMISS
One of the claims in case number 63,695 was for damages
against Zions Bank arising out of a trustee's sale conducted
many years ago. Mr* Christiansen was the successful bidder and
purchaser at that sale.
Plaintiffs' claims were that the sale, where their property
had been sold, had been improperly announced or scheduled and
improperly conducted*

lf

Improperlyw may be too weak a word to

describe plaintiffs' claims - they said that the bank and Mr.
Christiansen and other defendants conspired together to
schedule and to conduct an illegal sale*
In any event, however, plaintiffs have now settled their
claims against Zions Bank. In the process of settling, the
plaintiffs signed a stipulation in which the following language
appears:
0253
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Hatch et al. v. Zions et al., Case number 63,695, 57,127 and
Order on Mr. Christiansen's motions (1) to dismiss and (2) for
attorney's fees, Page - 3 Plaintiffs ... stipulate ... that the trustee's sale
... was a bona fide, arm's length, non-collusive,
valid and binding ... sale. Plaintiffs ... abandon ...
all claims ... which ... challenge ... the validity
... of ... the title of the purchaser.
Admittedly, plaintiffs' stipulations were subject to
certain conditions. But, so far as I know, all the conditions
have been met.
Plaintiffs have no further cause of action against Mr.
Christiansen. His motion to dismiss is granted.
ANA-LYSIS IN RE MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
Mr. Christiansen has asked for an award of attorney's fees.
He limits his request to the time period when bankruptcy case
number 89B-05176 was filed and open. This case was filed in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah by the
plaintiffs as the petitioners.
Mr. Christiansen's request is based on the claim that
plaintiffs should have notified the parties and the Court of
(1) the filing and (2) the dismissal of the bankruptcy matter.
Both events occurred during the pendency of these proceedings.
Plaintiffs gave no notice.
Plaintiffs' response to the motion is that no notice was
required because a petitioner before the United States
Bankruptcy Court can elect to trigger the automatic stay or not.
This response is a ^ j g l 2 S 5 e £ 3 i of 11 USC 362, which
0253
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Hatch et al. v. Zions et al., Case number 63,695, 57,127 and
Order on Mr. Christiansen's motions (1) to dismiss and (2) for
attorney's fees# Page - 4 contains words of mandate (e.g., "shall11) • The filing of a
petition triggers the automatic stay and automatically
transfers all the petitioner's non-exempt property to the
trustee.
Defendant's motion for attorney's fees is granted, subject
to this condition: defendant must provide proof of the amount
claimed within 30 days. A sworn affidavit will be allowed as
prooff subject, of course, to objection.

Dated:

Hi
i / /7/u
' ' /19 1\

JdU^
>

David L. Mower

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order on Mr. Christiansen's motions (1) to dismiss
and (2).for attorney's fees was served by U. S Mail, on
the /^-S» day of April, 1991, on the following:
Spencer F. Hatch, 19221 Sherborne Lane,
Huntington Beach, Ca. 92646
Howard F. Hatch, 843 South 1150 East, Pleasant
Grove (84062)
Sam Primavera, 37 East 400 North, Provo, Utah
(84601)
Dwane Sykes, 1511 South Carterville Road, orem,
Utah (84058)
Ruth Ragozzine, General Delivery, Hurricane, Utah
(84737)
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the motion to dismiss claims against William
Christiansen and the order for dismissal of claims against William Chiistiansen were sent first
class postage prepaid on 2.)
day of
AJ^^^J^^
19 <fc
to:

Ralph C. Amott
60 E. 100 S. Stel02
Provo, UT 84606
Clark R. Nielsen
Henriod and Nielsen
1160 Eagle Gate Tower
60 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004
Gordon Duval
Duval, Hansen, Witt and Morley, LLC
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Dwane Sykes
1511 S. Carterville Rd.
Orem, UT 84057
Max Ferre
1973 R 2400 N.
Layton, UT 84004
R. Kent Ludlow
Nielsen and Senior
P.O. Box 11808
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

ADDENDUM 3

0024

Sam Primavera (5413)
Attorney for Plaintiff
3707 N Canyon M. Ste JA
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 2264993
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ORDER

Dwane Sykes et al

Plaintiffs,

v.
Howard Hatch

Defendant.

|

Civil No. 810457127

i

HONORABLE JUDGE MOWER
Dale: 5 July 1995

Being fully advised on the matter by a hearing on June 30 1995 and by arguments
and testimony received, the court makes the following ruling:

1)

The action of selling the Mr. William C. Christiansen's property by sheriff's sale is
not supported by the requisite order from this or any other court of competent
jurisdiction.

2)

Any reopening of the question of whether Mr. William Christiansen was a
"strawman" of Mr. Sykes under the facts of this case is barred by the doctrine of
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"res judicata*, inasmuch as this issue was dealt with in a prior order which was
subsequently upheld on appeal.

3)

The sheriff's sale of Mr. William C. Christiansen's 3 acres of real property located
next to the property at 1511 S. Carterville road is quashed.

4)

Mr. Hatch is also ordered not to attempt the attachment or sale of any property, the
title to which is in the name of William C Christiansen.

5)

Attorney's fees are granted under Rule 11 to Mr. Christiansen in the amount of
$350.00; inasmuch as the attempt to attach Mr. Christiansen's property was
frivolous, obviously prohibited by "res judicata" and proper procedure was not
followed since Mr. Christiansen was not properly served nor made a party to this
suit thereby wasting the time of counsel and this court

Judge Mower

PREPARED BY:

Sam Primavera
746 E 3800 N.
Provo, UT 84604
(801) 226-0993

ADDENDUM 4

Howard F. Hatch
843 South 1150 East
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
(801)785-4818 / 785-8000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD F. HATCH,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT

v.
DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L. SYKES,
BENOY & ANGELA TAMANG, Trustees
of the so-called "Irrevocable
Trust Agreement", aka "THE DWANE SYKES
AND PATRICIA SYKES CHILDREN'S TRUST
AND/OR THE DWANE AND PATRICIA SYKES
TRUST", JOHNNY M. IVERSON & MAX S. FERRE.

CASE NO.

JUDGE

Defendants.
The Plaintiff, Howard F- Hatch, complains of the Defendants under
the

Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Utah Code Section 25-6-1 et seg,, as

follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff

resides in Pleasant Grove, Utahr

and acts

com-

plained of in the main took place within Utah Countyr Utah.
2.

Defendants Dwane J. Sykes and the Tamangs live in Orem, Utah

County, Utah.
3-

Defendant

Dennis

L-

Sykes is a resident of the

State

of

Alaska4-

The

real property transfered to the alleged trust or

Defendants for the purpose of defrauding creditors is located in

other
Utah

Countyr Utah.
5-

Defendant

Johnny M.

living in Highland, Utah.

Iverson is a resident of Utah

County,

6.

Defendant Max S«

Ferre is a resident of the State of Utah,

living in Layton, Davis Countyr Utah,
7.
the

The original acts of Defendant Dwane J.

Sykes which led

claims of Plaintiff creditor giving rise to the subsequent

to

judg-

ment, and hence this action, have all been committed within the jurisdiction

of

this State and for the more part within the

confines

of

this County.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS
8.
option

On or about the 6th of June, 1974, Plaintiff entered into an
agreement

certain

with

Defendant

Dwane Sykes for

the

purchase

of

land in Utah County subject of this present action which then

belonged to the Plaintiff.
9.

Said option was taken in the name of Defendant Dennis Sykes,

ostensibly for tax purposes, but it would now appear for the

purpose

of avoiding creditors.
10•
converted
11assigned
12.

On

or about the 13th of November,

1974,

said option

was

into a Uniform Real Estate Contract between the parties.
On

or

about the 30th

of

November,

1974, Dennis

Sykes

said contract to Dwane J. Sykes.
On or about May 26, 1975, a deed was issued to Dennis Sykes

by Plaintiff in consumation of the preceeding option and contract, but
which

title

soon thereafter passed to Dwane Sykes by

Warranty

Deed

dated July 28, 1975.
13,

On or about June 7,

1978r title to said property was quit-

claimed to Dennis L. Sykes for the purpose of avoiding creditors *

14.
in

At or about the same time, Dwane Sykes conveyed his interest

other property which he had acquired from

Raggozine

and

Exhibit

"A"

others
attached

Mr.

to Dennis Sykes for a

and

Mrs-

similar

hereto for a particular

Anthony

purpose.

description

of

See
said

properties.
15.

Dwane Sykes, during the intervening yearsr has had recorded

bogus encumbrances against the subject real properties for the purpose
of

creating the illusion that these were encumbered.

doing

so

would appear to have been to defraud

including
them.

the Plaintiff,

His purpose in

potential

so they would not seek to

creditors,

execute

against

We base this allegation on the fact that prospects of an action

which might result in a judgment against Mr* Sykes have been very real
since problems began between the parties in the late 1970's.
of

Judgment entered in the consolidated cases, Civ.

No-

See copy

57,127 and

63r695 in this jurisdiction which is attached as Exhibit "B".
16-

These charges were brought by the present Plaintiff as early

as 1981,

and amplified in a follow-on action in 1983, which resulted

in

the

money judgment just referred to.

Other

parties

have

been

pursuing Dwane Sykes legally during these same several, years.
17.
Sykes,

On
in

"contract
Dwane
,P M

or about the 31st of December,

what would appear to be a sworn
interest" in certain real property

1987, Defendant Dennis
affidavit,

asserted

on behalf of

a

Defendant

Sykes, which rear property is more fully described in

Exhibit

C , attached hereto and made a .part of this action thereby, to wit:

l^]002

a 3 1/4 acre parcel of land located on Carterville Road in Orem, Utah,
and ostensibly held in the name of one William Christiansen, but which
in fact, to be property belonging to and used by Defen-

would appear,
dant

Dwane

SyKes.

"Application
forgery,
est

Plaintiff alleges that

said

document

entitled

for Assessment and Taxation of Agricultural Land"

is a

was illegally notarized {since by one having a direct inter-

therein,

Patricia

Sykes) but also an attempt to defraud

either

Utah County or the Plaintiff.
18.
of

In the meantime, other real property was placed in the name

Defendant Johnny Iverson for the same

purpose,

i.e.,

defrauding

Plaintiff and/or other potential creditors, but later transferred to a
J.

Glade Dursteller.
19.

9,

See legal descriptions in attached Exhibit "D",

Demand was made by Defendant James Sauers in a letter March

1994f to said Iverson that he convey his interest in one of thoses

two

pieces of real property

alleged

trust

to him,

Sauers,

as the "trustee" of an

so that a sale of said property might

be

consumated.

See Exhibit "E" attached,
20*

That

on

or

about the

3rd

of

June,

1994, Dwane

Sykes

mysteriously produced for recording a Warranty Deed allegedly executed
by

Johnny M-

Iverson describing two parcels of real property subject

of this action, to wit: Lot 29, Plat "A" in Lynnwood Park Subd., Orem,
Utah,

and

a parcel of land and house located at

Carterville Road,
"D"•

We

Orem,

Utah County,

Utah,

allege that this instrument,

illegally notarized, and therefore void.

about

1475

South

as described in Exhibit

if not a total

forgery,

was

10003

21. Heretofore, Johnny Iverson had refused to convey title to the
Lynnwood
sed.

Park property until certain obligation due him were

addres-

This property, along with unrecorded title to a house and lot at

approx.
f, M

D,

1475 South Carterville,

ve allege,

Orem,

Utah, as described on Exhibit

was being held all along by Mr. Iverson for the sole

purpose of defeating creditors of Dwane Sykes.
22. As per the deed referred to in Paragraph 20f title was ostensibly
Deed

passed to Mr.

Dusteller,

and from him to Defendant Sauers

recorded in the Utah County Records as

Entry

No*

by

46745, Book

Page 177, a copy of which document is attached as Exhibit "P M ,

3460,

We allege this to be a fraudulent conveyance and should be set aside.
23.
Claim

That on or about July 15, 1987, Dwane Sykes conveyed by Quit

Deed

Defendant

nine
Max S.

separate tracts of land located in Utah
Perre without consideration and for

purpose

of defrauding creditors.

Exhibit

V .

24.
veyed

containing
Sykes,

Warranty

in Utah

purpose of defrauding creditors-

granting

County,

23 acres, belonging to Defendant Dwane

without adequate consideration and for the sole and

25.

exclusive

1984, Dwane J. Sykes con-

Deed title to a parcel of land

approximately

the

to

A copy of said deed is attached1 as

On or about the 5th of February,

by

County

J*

exclusive

See Exhibit MH" attached.

On or about the 8th of February, a jury rendered its verdict
a money judgment against the Defendant Dwane J.

Sykes

and

others in excess of $500,000, to wit: Howard F. Hatch^ Plaintiff, vs.
Dennis L-

Sykes, Dwane J.

Sykes, Patriot o~i—

0004

Civil No.

810457127,

in the Fourth Judicial District Court, State of

See attached copy of Judgment, Exhibit "B u ,

Utah.

26. On or about the 13th day of February, 1995, just 5 days after
jury verdict was rendered against Dennis L.
Patricia Sykes,
the Tamangs,

Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes and

a quit claim deed was executed by Dennis in favor

of

conveying title to four separate pieces of real property

in Utah County.

We allege that these properties were previously held

in Dennis Sykes1 name for the benefit of Dwane Sykes, and that the socalled
set

trust(s) to whom conveyance has been made are a sham and

up for the benefit of Dwane Sykes, have been controlled

by

were
him

contrary to law and are intended for the primary purpose of defrauding
creditors

and therefore should be set aside.

(See two page

document

attached as Exhibit "A" entitled "Quit-Claim Deed").
27.

Since that time, Plaintiff has been attempting to execute on

properties belonging to the debtor Dwane J.
to

Sykes without success due

his effective efforts in conveying or having conveyed the

properties

to

others without consideration,

or lacking in

subject
adequate

consideration, for the purpose of defrauding Plaintiff or other creditors.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1.
all

Plaintiff

therefore prays that this court will

declare

of the conveyances of the subject properties as described in

Exhibits
and

The

attached

hereto and made a part of this complaint are

void and will ascertain the true owner of the 3 1/4

being

held

in the name of w-i n-**™ ^ — J

acre

the
null

parcel

121005

portion,

if n o t a l l , b e l o n g s t o D e f e n d a n t D v a n e S y k e s and is suscept-

a b l e to execution2-

We

brances

w o u l d also ask that this court e x a m i n e t h e v a r i o u s

and/or

notices

of i n t e r e s t w h i c h m a y a p p e a r

e n c u m b e r said r e a l p r o p e r t i e s ,
effect,
under

of

constructive

record

to

a n d to judge them t o b e v o i d and of n o

s e t t i n g them a s i d e and p l a c i n g a l l of t h e s u b j e c t
a

encum-

t r u s t p u r s u a n t to e x e c u t i o n

thereon

properties
for

the

p u r p o s e of s a t i s f y i n g t h e j u d g m e n t o b t a i n e d a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t D v a n e J.
Sykes•

3.

We further ask this court to grant us any reasonable attorney

fees expended in this action, together with all allowable court costs.
Respectfully submitted this j*CT(A> day of November, 1995.

0006

^Ktitg/T

Whereas Dennis I,, Sykea, aka Dennif Lynn Sykes has held
property In hia personal name, ai nominee and ea Trustee for an
Irrevocable Trust datad June 1, 197B aa set forth in the two
(2) Schedule* -A" attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein; and
Whereas, Dannie L* Sykes ceased to serve as Trustee ot the
aaid Trust; and
Whereea, Banoy and Angela Tomang have bean appointed aa
Trustees of said Trusts and agreed to serve as Trustees of said
Trust* and are the currently serving Trustees of said Trust)
and
Whereas, Dennis L, Sykea intands to convey any title he may
have aa the former Trustee of said Truet in real property
located In Utah County to the currently serving Trustees of
said Trust;
NOW THEREFOREi
Dennio L. Sykes, aka Dennis Lynn Sykes, Grantor/ hereby
QU1T-CLAIBS to Banoy and Angela Taraang, Trustees, of 1035 Bast
1630 Southr Oram, Utah 64 056, or their successors in interest
aa Trustees, Grantees, for the eum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER
GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the following described tracts
of land In Utah County, State of Utaht
Parcel li
Beginning at a point on the east aide of the
Cartervllle Road, which point le North 520.03 feet and Beat
1381,56 feet from the Meat quarter cornter of Section 2S,
Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence North 3° 05' Eaat along fence and Cartervllle Road
151.25 feet; thence North 74° 46V Eaat 130.92 feet to the
center line of an existing road; thence North 64« 03' East
54.05 feetr thence South 85° 12' Eaat 4fi,li feet; thonca
South 36° 26' Eaat 92.31 feat; thence leaving the center
line of .the existing road; thence South 90.60 feet; thence
Eaat 160.00 feat; thence North 96.92 feet; thence east
157.74 feet; thence South 16° 36' Eaat 59,14 feet; thence
South 6° 56' Vest 70.89 feat; thence South 24° 42' East
14Br45 feet; thence North 62° 53' West 195.33 feet along a
fence; thence South 6° 16' Vast 41.96 feet along a fence;
thence North 62° 42' Vest 305.94 feet along a fence; thence
North BB° 03" wast 33.77 feat along a fBnce to J. Theron
Smith property/ thence North 2° 12' Eaat 90.00 feet along
fence and said property line; thence North 85° IB' Ueat
along a fence and property line 142.00 feet to beginning and
to the Cartervllle Road,
iHi
9 4 .M F' 3/»?l H 7 A 2
FrAHDALL A .
COV/JN6TON
U T A H C O U N T Y KC'CQRDCft ,

sf'weo w

t 0013 <**?<*~r II

/f

/L

s/~

1*3007

CUT

9*21

BK362I

^ 2 6 3

Together with all eaaemente, acceaaet, right* of way
and right! in and to aald property.
Pareal 2i
Commencing 0,47 feat Bait of tha Horthveat corner of
Lot 3/ Block 36, Plat "A", Pleeaant Orova City Sarvayi
thanca Eaat 195,78 feet? thanca South 200 faatj thanca Watt
200.38 feat; thanca South 1° 19' Wait 12,4 feetj thanca
North 09° 25' Weat 153.05 faatj thanca tiorth 0« 10' wait
212.41 faatf thanca South 69° 22' Eaet 60,5 taetj thanca
South 1* 19' Neat 100 faatj thanca South 09* 22' Kaet 70
faati thanca North 100 faat to tha point of bagInning.
Parcel 3i
Commencing 149.16 faat Wait of tha Northeaet corner of
Lot *, Block 36, Plot "A", Pleeaant Grova city Survey ot
Building U>ta; thanca Vast 43.3* foot? thanca South 130.0
faatf thanca Eaftt 43.34 faatj thanca Horth 130,0 faat to
place of beginning.
Parcel 4i
Commencing at a point North 620.0 faat and Beat 1667.4
faat from tha Want quarter cornar of Section 25, T6B, R2E,
SLBfcMf thanca North 76 feet; thanca Eaat 160 feeti thanca
South 136 faat] thanca treat 160 feat; thanca North 60 faat
to tha point of taginning.
Vltnaaf tha hand of aald Grantor this

F+tr

-* day of

»*£
Dannie L, Sykee '

STKTZ OF UTAH
COUNT* OP SALT U K E

)
i ea,
)

Oh tha /3i>day of
r£$JL*AAi
, l9fS_, personally
appeared before me Dennla L. Byket, the algner of tha foragoing
Quit-Claim Dead, who duly acknowledged before ma that ha
executed the aane<
Ky ComffiiBBlon Expiration Data
and Addreaa arei

f^ ^
X*+^'^tri£&/
Notary PublTc /^mam*B'
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Howard F. Hatch, pro se
843 South 1150 East
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Ph: (801)785-4818/785-8000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES
AND PATRICIA SYKES,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

'

JUDGMENT

1

CIVIL NO, B10457127

i

JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER

HOWARD F. HATCH,
Defendant and Counterclaimant
This action came on trial before the Court and a jury on February
6,

1995, Honorable David L. Mower, presiding, for the sole purpose of

determining the extent of damages,

the issue of liability having been

granted in favor of the Defendant/counterclaimant,
by

Howard

F-

Hatch,

default previously entered as against all three of the Plaintiffs,

Dennis L,
damages

Sykes, Dwane J,

having

Sykes and Patricia Sykes.

The matter of

been duly assessed and the jury having duly

rendered

its verdict*
It

is Ordered and Adjudged: that the

defendant/counterclaimant,

Howard F.
Sykes

Hatch, recover of the plaintiffs, Dennis L- Sykes, Dwane J.
^sro^SM?-^ Dt>and Patricia Sykes, the sura of 0510,Q3C -00, with interest

thereeon

after

4udgmefrtr

at the rate of 9,22 percent

per

annum

as

provided by law,^and his costa of action including attorneys fees; ^COL
Such

amounts

in judgment as determined by the jury

are

broken

down as follows:
FOR

THE CONVERSION OF WATER STOCK;

$6,000 plus interest at the

legal rate from the time of conversion September 2,
BwaJb-—and -thereafter until paid.
equally between the three oiain^**-

1975, until 3-^dg-

Said liability to

be

distributed

$009

FOR TRESPASS:
0

530,000 pjtes~-£gfceau-a-fc at the legal rata from

^ ±i«e-CF£-^hidgn!S»^^

ttofr

said liability to be distributed equally

between plaintiffs Dwane J, Sykes and Patricia Sykes.
FOR SLANDER OF TITLE CAUSING THE LOSS OF REAL PROPERTY:
plus

interest

at the legal rate from the time of loss May

until jgjAgpffmirt. aacl lhfar.frar#*^ri~uuLil p<±4d.

$105/000
4/

1983/

Said liability to be

dis-

tributed equally between the three plaintiffs.
FOR
$10/000

INTERFERENCE

IN

AN

ADVANTAGEOUS

BUSINESS

RELATIONSHIP:

plus-—xnLmes-L at Llie legal-rate from-the—ti*ne—e€—^^grneBt. /-

P^until ^ai»d.

Said

liability to be distributed equally

between

the

three plaintiffs.
AS

PUNITIVE DAMAGES:

?225/000 g^^-4Trbel^e^t^^t the loga-1—Mrfce °

QV-" feeeifi—feh«—time erf judgment until -jfraJid.

Said liability to

be

dis-

tributed equally between the three plaintiffs.
AND
IN

THE

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE
AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S

COLLECTING

SAID

JUDGMENT

BY

EXECUTION OR

FEES

OTHERWISE

AUGMENTED

EXPENDED
AS

SHALL

IN
BE

ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.
JLH—pq-yM^^ +o thi fi-yAi^n ha^ 3 ^ppearfifl p ™
doctors ' r^ftr^rrrr
tLtah

1^11 South C i r f Q n n ' i ^ R^a*7—-03ee*ft-r 0*^.

in nn fallows:

8 4058• -—She—a-3rfc^rnate addrocc of judgment

.gyfeids, isr-1315 Cuiduvd bt^ggtr^i^pr^^
ENTERED by the court this

Sfee- 3nrlgaentr-Pu

^

S*

debtorf—Dennis—irrD^
Ala^k^. 0^

day of V&L&k, 1995.

"C"
P»ga

*

el.

APPUCATION FOR ASSESSMENT AND TAXATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND
1069 FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT
At Provkfrt Under Wa/i Code Ann, §50-*e$ through fSP-5-7G5 (1953. ax amended)
rq

BE TYPED OH PRINTED I N INK

Ownerd):

529

Dcnnla L, Sykcg
?.

Mailing AWtoU*

54

6974

. Social Security No._

0, Box 436 - Provp, UT _M60_3-04 36

Lessee (II applicable) ,

. Social Security No._

Application Is hereby made for aafresamenl and faaaiiDn of the following legolly described agricultural land.
OHv ftl Appllcallon

County .

12

ENT4-4B1S fr 2 4 S C PG 2 3 * 5

~31.~£7-.

Utah

HJKA * REtD UTAH COUMTt SECORDER DEP AT
19E7 DEC 21 4:36 Pfl FEE W-00
fcECOftDEO FOR PENHIS STKE5

. Properly Serial Na(s)

Complete Legal Description (a)' fAttach adalfhnoi pvgas (I necesseryj
P r o p e r t y S e r i a l Number: l ° i 0 0 $ t Q 0 0 3 : 1 4 2
0 ^ 0 U t a h C o u n t y Number i E - 3 ? 3 - l ? ~ < »
Owner Name r
5 Y K E 3 , DENMIS L

T*x O f f t M e t
Acres*

COM N 4 2 0 FT A £ 1 4 4 7 . 4 FT FR u 1 / 4 COR SEC 2 3 , T 6 S , R 2 E ,
0 F T | fi 133 F T ; U 140 F T - N 40 FT TO BEG»R£A , 5 0 OF AN AC.
Tola! number of aces Included In this application,

Ki

5 L M ; N 74 F T |

&r?2

A. ^.9"

1 CERTIFY THAT:
1.

The agricultural lend covered by this application constitutes no less man fi^tioiifiguouf acres excoaive of fho
homeslle and other non-agrieuliural acreage (Sao Utah Code Ann ££9-$»87 (7) for waiver.):

2

Tho above described eligible land la currently devoted to agricultural use and ha* been aa devoted lor two
successive years fmmedlaiaiy preceding me ta* year lor which valuation under this act Is requested,

3

The gross aalea (tai reportable Income) ol agricultural product produced ihereon have *v*r&qe4 ai leaai Jl.uou
par fear lor the lw© year period immediately preceding the tax year in Issue Stele; Ulfipfnc' »** records win fre used
Ap-Yftfily Income, and

4

I am fully m n j ihe (Iveyear rollback provision which becomes effective upon a change In ihe use ol all or part
ol the above deacrlbod eligible land I understand tho provision of ihe rollback rex which requires notice lo the
county assessor of any Change In U9a of »n« land to Other than agriculture, and that a 100 percent penally Of Ihe
computed roil-back lax duo win be tmpoaea on failure to notify the aaseasor wlinln 90 dBy* after change In land

Cc/pOt*tm Nmm0

/ —

use only

II •••

Notary Public
DENNIS I . 5YKES

The haraln application let
Bppo»r#d otfore r,»e

AppUtmnt

and 4uecule0 \h*9 documanf o«Jl

'

i

Pay

19BH

Of

ApprOv-d f*i/0>ec/ fo review/

O

Denied

(lay of

By
fiqaldlnQ/l>|^r^e^!gr<^:gir

=£2^

_ ^ ^ _

Covntw

County nteardar

Fee _

Eftfty NO .

A^lcuWp eyirirdwnvrmustba til** ©Aof before January 1. ol
iKe CurreWli^yeaj^ LalOTllingi •(!» o* ecpepted tor eo day* aliar FiltO .
ArftfjSrF fnipfarrfaymfJplO't $23 penalty
Dklrb>uu»n J w&ir4CJd*J*>A<J — A w i w

Book

ney
'OfttfT0<uz tevMH
nEire o m s n o m TO COUUTT AaaetsOH

. Pag* ,

0»0i*rv

0009

90
0.50

£

1$

Bon

ENT46818 BK 2 4 8 0 P6 2 8 6
GREENBELT APPL1 .1*1 1&4

^ G E 2 OF 2
Yttrt
1981...
Ta* District #i 90
Acresi
2.52

ProptAty Strlfcl Hurler «9*006l0004jl42
Old Utah Countv JK,b*r _ 575-19-B'
Own tr «vi/i
i -vr-, "--E'vWS L
COM ON E SlCr 3* ;»vrf;-.RVILLE ROAD N 520.08 FT * E 1381.56 FT FR W 1/4 COR SEC 25
, T6SP R2E, L/Mz - 4 05' E ALONG FENCE & CARTERVlLLE ROAD 151,25 FTf N 74 46 1/2
' € 190.92 FT TO CEN LINE OF A ROAD) N 64 03' £ 54.05 FTi S 85 12' E 48.11 FTi
S 36 26' E 92*31 FTf LEAVING CEN LINE OF R0AD| S 90.80 FTf E 160 FTf N 96.92 FT|
E 51,74 FT* S 243 FT| N 82 53'W 27.33 FT ALONG A FENCEf S 6 16'W 41 .96 FT ALONG
A FENCEl N 82 42'U 305.94 FT ALONG FENCEf N 88 03'W 33.77 FT ALONG A FENCE TO J.
THERON SMITH PROP| N 2 12' E 90 FT ALONG FENCE *WD SD PROP LINE| N 85 18'W ALONG
A FENCE & PROP LINE 142 FT TO BEG * TO CARTERVILLE ROAD. AREA 2.52 ACRES.
Property Serial Number I I9i006l0002i242
Tax District Hi 90
Old Utah County Number* E-575-19
Acres*
1-97
Owner Name I CHRISTIANSEN, UILLIAM (DENNIS SYKES, CONTRACT BUYER)
COM AT A PT OF E SIDE OF CARTERVILLE ROAD N 671 .06 FT & 1389.7 FT FR W 1/4 COR S
EC 25, T 6Sf R 2E, SLMf N 3 05' E ALONG FENCE * tARTERVlLLE ROAD 221-28 FTf S 84
10 1/2' E 323.18 FT ALONG FENCEf N 41 57' E 61.04 FTf N 37 55'E 166.14 FTf N 52
18'E 10 FTf S 373 FTf U 51.74 FTf N 39.08 FTf (J 160 FTf S 45.2 FTf N 36 26'U 92
.31 FTf N 85 12'U 48.11 FTf S 64 03'W 54.05 FT| S 74 46'30»U 130.92 FT TO BfcG.
AREA 2.13 ACRES, LESS J 6 ACRE.
Property Serial Number! I9i006:0017il42
Old Utah County Number: EE-828-3
Owner Namet SYKES, D£rt*I8 L

Tax District Hi 30
Acres*
0.69

COM N 656.92 FT & 1897.12 FT FR U 1/4 COR SEC 23, T6B, R2EP SLMf N 90 E 106 FTf
S 16 38'E 58-14 FTf S 6 56'W 70.89 FTf S 24 42'£ 148.45 FTf N 82 53'W 168 FTf N
243 FT TO BEG. AREA .69 ACRE
T
Property Serin1 Number J 19t006i0018i242
*x District ft» 30
Old Utah County Number* EE-828-4
Acr**i
1.04
Owner Name 7 CHRISTlrfV*B£N% UILLIAM (DERMIS SYKES, CONTRACT dUVER>

COM N 1041.6 FT & E 1873.93 FT FR W 1/4 COR SEC 25P T6S, R2E. SLMf N 52 18'E 27.
64 FTf N 7* iS'E 26.42 FTf N 83 51 'E 59.36 FT| S 7 29'E 194.82 FTf S 13 Ol'W 83.
42 FT) S 1 53'W 129.41 FTf S 16 38'E 9,43 FT* W 106 FTf N 373 FT TO BEG. AREA 1
.04 ACRES
Property Serial Number* 19t006*0020i242
Tax District lit 90
Old Utah County Numberi E-575-19-C
Acres*
0.16
Owner Name i UNIVERSITY AVE DEV ASSOC <DEWIS SYKES CONTACT BUYER)
COM N 884.66 FT & E 1403.79 FT FR Ml/4 COR, SEC 25f T6S, R2E. SLMf S 84-«U'30*E
100 FTf S 3~05'W 70 FT; N 84-l0'30"i; 100 FT| N 3-05'E 70 FT TO BEG. AREA .16 AC
RE.

moi2

&xrtr#t
/r D

-

WARRANTY DEED

/'

JOHMMY 'I. 1VCRS0N
fliiWM

Coumy of

of V. tl."Box 4 3 6 , Provo

Utah

34603

V » i * *f u m i , hcrcfiy

CONVEY #odWAMANT i©

EMT +47++

4 . GIAOC milST€LL£fi

8K 3 4 6 0 pG 1 7 6

NINA B ACID WW CD RECOKDEft BY flB
1994 JUH 3 4i3< Ml FEE 10.00
KECQfiOCfi FOR JAKES U GAUtRG

gi«n<ec
of P. 0 , 0 o x ' 4 3 6 , Provo
Utah 6460J-04J6
(or tht turn of $10.00 h o t h e r <iood and valuab I c o n s i d e r a t i o n , r e c e i v e d tn hand,
the fotfowittf *ucill>*4 i ttc ts

*f I«n4 In Or e m , U t a h

County, 5f Jie of Ifufc:

SCHEOJLE *&•

ilFuitad In Utah CwmrrTttiirof UUfi
f91lnnlii« *t « point on ttto wroor on tho Not odf» «f * « / " £ " > !
Rood •** tin tho Booth odg* or Ho*m Unt. ohlch point la Hartli M*.0«
foot ond Cast MQJ.If f « * , *oro or « • « , ' ™ * J ^ L ^ o " « I

«l.

and HiMdlorii thoncO Booth »4 do*, 1 0 l / * * • • * • «
'™\S%*1*
httfo* and fooca on tho Booth Jldo of Hooo Law; thane* Smith 3 do^
•5- «oot ?* foot: thoiico Worth M d.g. ^ 1/2 'Jioatjoo ftft ta t N
East odga of CartanrUlo Koadj thoncO North 3 d*g* 0* *. Mt . V
along trio Cost aldo of cortonrfMo Hood to th« point of boolimtno,
and
ft,

LOT 2 9 , MLAr * A * f tttfWUUO PARK S U 8 D m $ I O h \ 0REH« UTAH, ACCOS0IH6 fo THE
OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE IN THE OFFICE OT IHE RECORDER l / M H CQUMTT, UfAH
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March 9, 1994
Box 436 Provo, UT

Johnny M. Iverson
7096 W 10400 N
American Fork, UT

84601

84004

Dear Mr* Iverson:
As you know, as the former trustee for the Sykes children, title to the
house at 949 E 1120 S, Orem, Utah, Is still held In your name as nominee for
the trust. As you are also aware, this house has sold and the closing Is
set for 1:00 p.m. Thursday, Marcn 10, 1994p at Access Title Co*, 1455 So.
State St*, Orem, UT., Dy Wayne Tanner, President.
This Is a formal request that you attend that closing so as to sign the deed
to the trust property and relevant closing papers* Thank you*
Sincerely,

Jim Sauers, Successor Trustee
cc:

David H. Shawcroft, PI. Grove, UT
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WARRANTY DEED

m

DHAKE J . SYKES' 4 PATRICIA StKES
Grueltor?,.., r f

ISU So- Carter? I l l a Rd. Orem, Utah

hot*by C O N V E X . AND WARRANT-, Wi~
HA* S. FERRE

Gnat**..., oL_
for th« iion of-

4338 W 2650 N, Plain City, Utah

84404

110.00 and other good ^nd valuable consideration
Utah

..JJOLLABS
-County,

th« following d©icrlfc*d tr«ct of Und fiL>«».„
S u t « of UUK, to-vffc

That portion of the South one-half of the South one-half of the Northwest
quarter of Section 26, Township Eight South* Range One East. Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, ly.lng West of that North-South feneellne situated along the toe of the
east embankment of the Strawberry H1ghl1ne Canal Road, and including said canal
and canal road and property West thereof, being 23 acres, more or less.
Including therewith a right-of-way easen&nt for ingress and egress over and upor.
Che Strawberry Hlghline Canal Road throi,.,nout Sections 23, 26, and 35 T. 8 S.,
R 1 E* and throughout Sections 2, 11, 14, and 23 T 9 S»ft1 E, SLB&M, and
the connecting roads theretoSubject to all easements, rights* reseveratlons and restrictions of record.

WITNESS TrtE HAND.-S. of laid Grantor..?, thb
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ADDENDUM 5

RALPH C. AMOTT (#68)
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 377-6575
IN" THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UT
STATE OF UTAH

HJNTY

oooOooo

HOWARD F, HATCH,

*
*

Plaintiff/

AMENDED
COMPLAINT

*
*
VB,

DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L.
*
SYKES, BENOY & ANGELA
TAMANG, Trustees of the so*
called "Irrevocable Trust
Agreement", aka "THE DWAYNE
*
SYKES AND PATRICIA SYKES
*
CH1LDRENS' TRUST AND/OR THE
*
DWAYNE AND PATRICIA SYKES TRUST,*
JOHNNY M. IVERSON, MAX FERRE,
*
J. Glade Dursteller, James
*
Sauers, Patricia Sykes, William *
Christiansen,
Defendants.
Counterclaimant.

CIVIL No. 950400719 CV

*
oooOooo

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through his attorney Ralph CAmott, and allege against Defendants by way of Amended Complaint as
granted by the Court as follows:
JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

1.
Utah,

That Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of
and

the

acts

complained

of

herein

and

the

alleged

fraudulently conveyed real property described herein are located in
1

Utah County, State of Utah2.

That this

action is brought

for violation of the

provisions of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, UCA 25-6-1 et seq., by
Defendant Dwane J. Sykes to avoid his lawful creditors and their
lawful claims, and with the complicity of the named defendants3.

That Defendants Dwane J, Sykes, Benoy and Angela Tamang,

and Johnny M. Iverson are residents of Utah County•
4. That Defendant Dennis Sykes is a resident of the State of
Alaska.
5.

That Defendant Max Ferre is a resident of Davis County,

State of Utah.
6-

That Defendants Patricia Sykes, J. Glade Dursteller, and

James Sauer and William Christiansen

are believed to be residents

of Utah County, State of Utah.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS
7. That Plaintiff has had legal dispute with Defendant Dwane
J. Sykes since shortly after he first entered into an option
agreement with Defendant Dwane Sykes in June of 1974 to sell
Plaintiff's home and property located at 1511 South Carterville
Road, in Orem, Utah.
8.
property

That after Defendant Dwane Sykes received title to said
in 1975 there arose serious legal disputes between

Plaintiff and Defendant Dwane Sykes wherein Plaintiff felt Sykes
was making wrongful

claims on property he did not own and

wrongfully encumbering property not in his name and other wrongful
acts. That these disputes led directly to the filing of
2

lawsuits

in the Fourth District Court of Utah County, (#57,127 and #63,695,
later consolidated in 1982), between these parties, Civ.#810457127,
in which Plaintiff made claim against Defendant Dwane Sykes, his
wife Patricia, and his brother Dennis for a large sum.
9.

That in the midst of these disputes and with full

knowledge of potential liabilities Defendant Dwane Sykes quitclaimed his interest in the Carterville property to his brother
Dennis Sykes, and on information and belief Plaintiff alleges that
said transfer was done for the purpose of avoiding and defrauding
potential creditors, and without sufficient consideration* (See Ex.
A-l, for copy of said deed).
10-

That in 1975 Defendant Dwane Sykes obtained other

property in his name in Utah County from Mr. and Mrs- Anthony
Raggozine. (See Ex. A2 deed attached) *

That on information and

belief this property was also transferred to Defendant Dwane Sykes1
brother Dennis at the same time period as the Carterville property
described above and when the legal disputes with Plaintiff were
heating up, and done for the purpose of avoiding and defrauding
potential creditors and without sufficient consideration.
11.

That Plaintiff, on information and belief, alleges that

Defendant Dwane Sykes, during the intervening years, has had
recorded bogus encumbrances against the subject real properties for
the purpose of creating the illusion that these were encumbered,
and in an attempt to avoid potential creditors, and to discourage
execution against these properties-

That these properties, and

others over which Defendant Dwane Sykes has control have been
3

transferred to various people and alleged "Trusts11 and assorted
trustees including Defendants Iverson and Ferre1 and others such as
J. Glade Dursteller and

James Sauers, and of which Defendants'

Tamang are the latest and most recent alleged "Trustees", all with
the

same

intent

to

avoid

and

defraud

creditors •

That

on

information and belief said Trust or Trusts are shams with the
primary purpose being the avoidance of creditors.
12-

That these bogus and fraudulent encumbrances/documents

include, but are not limited to, an apparent sworn affidavit dated
31 December, 1987 in which Defendant Dennis Sykes, asserted a
"contract interest" in certain real property on behalf of Defendant
Dwane Sykes, which real property is more fully described in Exhibit
"C", attached hereto and made a part of this action thereby, to
wit: a 3^1/4 acre parcel of land located on Carterville Road in
Orem, Utah, (referred to as the north 1/2) and ostensibly held in
the name of one William Christiansen, but which would appear, in
fact, to be property belonging to and used by Defendant Dwane
Sykes, and which on information and belief of Plaintiff, was bought
for Defendant Dwane Sykes by Christiansen with Sykes moneyPlaintiff alleges on information and belief that said document
titled "Application for Assessment and Taxation of Agricultural
Land" is a forgery, was illegally notarized by one having a direct
interest therein, Patricia Sykes, and also an attempt to improperly
cloud title to this property

and thereby avoid

and defraud

creditors,
13.

That this "Application for Assessment and Taxation of
4

Agricultural Land", referred to in paragraph 12 previously, reveals
the pattern of fraudulent behavior of Defendant Dwane Sykes.

He

claims an interest in the property sufficient to ask for a
governmental break in taxation on one hand; then on the other hand
he claims the property is out of his name and not available for
creditors to attach14.

That other alleged fraudulent conveyances include the

following and besides those set forth above:
a.

That on or about June 3, 1994, Defendant Dwane Sykes

produced for recording a Warranty Deed (See Ex. M D M attached and
incorporated by reference herein) allegedly executed by Johnny M.
Iverson describing two parcels of real prperty subject of this
action, to wit: Lot 29, Plat "A" in Lynnwood Park Subd., Orem,
Utah, and a parcel of land and house located at about 1475 South
Carterville Road, Orem, Utah County, Utah, as described in exhibit
"D\

Heretofore, it is alleged by Plaintiff on information and

belief, Defendant Iverson had refused to convey title to the
Lynnwood Park property until certain obligations due him were
addressed.

It is alleged on information and belief that this

conveyance is a fraudulent document with a superimposed (or pasted
in) legal description and not actually signed by Defendant Iverson
for the purpose

intended.

It appears the document is even

notarized by Defendnat Dwane Sykes which would be improper as well.
This document therefore is another in a chain of fraudulent
conveyances hiding property from creditors and that Defendant
Iverson, and then subsequent transferees, were simply holding these
5

properties for the benefit of Defendant Dwane Sykes-

That they

were transferred without adequate consideration to insiders with
intent to defraud creditors.
That

the

chain of

fraudulent

conveyances

continued

through Iverson to Durstellar to Sauers, (See Ex. "F" attached
hereto and incorporated by reference herein).
b.

That on or about July 15, 1987 Defendant Dwane Sykes

conveyed by Quit-claim deed nine separate tracts of land located in
Utah

County

to

Defendant

Max

S.

Ferre

without

adequate

consideration and for the primary purpose of defrauding creditors.
(See Ex.

"G" attached

hereto

and

incorporated

by

reference

herein.)That on information and belief Defendant Ferre was holding
these properties for and on behalf and for the benefit of Defendant
Dwane Sykes peronally.
c.

That on or about the 5th of February, 1984, Defendant

Dwane Sykes conveyed by Warranty Deed to Defendant Max S- Ferre
title to a parcel of land in Utah County containing approximately
23 acres, belonging to Defendant Dwane Sykes, without adequate
consideration and for the sole or primary purpose of avoiding an
defrauding

creditors.

(See

Ex.

incorporated by reference herein).

"H"

attached

hereto

and

That defendant Ferre, and all

other defendant transferees herein were relatives or insiders as to
the financial condition of Defendant Dwane Sykes and were aware
that creditors had lawful claims against Defendant Dwane Sykes that
he could not or would not pay, or potential liability for the same.
d.

That an or about the 13th day of February, 1995, just a

few days after a large jury-awarded verdict was granted against
Defendant Dwane Sykes, Dennis Sykes, and others, as set forth in
paragraph 13 following,

a quit-claim deed was executed by Dennis

Sykes in favor of Defendant's Tamang as alleged Trustees on an
unspecified trust, conveying title to four separate pieces of real
property in Utah County.

On information and belief, Plaintiff

alleges that these properties were previously held in Dennis Sykes'
name for the benefit of Defendant Dwane Sykes, and that the socalled trust(s) to whom conveyance was made are a sham and were set
up for the benefit of Defendant Dwane Sykes, have been controlled
by him and are intended for the primary purpose of avoiding and
defrauding creditors and were without adequate consideration, and
therefore should be set aside.

(See Ex. "A3" attached hereto and

incorporated by reference herein,)
e.

On information and belief there were other fraudulent

conveyances, some yet to be identified, intended to bury and hide
assets of Defendant Dwane Sykes and these include, but are not
limited to, transfers to certain individuals named Pack, believed
to be insider relatives, and transfers to an entity called Frontier
International Land Corporation believed to be a front for Defendant
Dwane Sykes.
15.

That Plaintiff obtained a large money judgment in the

suit above referenced, #810457127, against Defendant Dwane Sykes
and others on February 6, 1995, in the amount of 509,942.03.(Said
judgment was later reduced to $141,693.52, by the Court after
motion for reconsideration). Original judgment attached as Ex. "B"
7

and amended judgment as Ex. "Bln, and incorporated by reference
herein.

CAUSE OF ACTION
16.

Plaintiff realleges all prior allegations as if the same

had been fully set forth herein.
17.

That the transfers set forth herein are fraudulent and

should be set aside for the benefit of Plaintiff creditor in that
Defendant Dwane Sykes, and those acting for him and with him, made
said transfers with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
Plaintiff

and

reasonably

other

credidtors,

and/or

without

receiving

a

equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or

obligation.
18. That at the time of these transfers Defendant Dwane Sykes
and those acting for him and with him, intended to, or knew he and
they were reasonably likely to, incur, or reasonably should have
known or believed, debts beyond Defendant Dwane Sykes ability to
pay when due.
19. That there are sufficient badges of fraudulent conveyance
in these transactions to justify this court holding that the
conveyances were fraudulent and should be declared void and set
aside and made subject to the lawful execution of Plaintiff
creditor*

These badges of fraudulent conveyances include:
a.

The conveyances alleged were made to relatives or

other insiders.
b. Defendant Dwane Sykes retained possession or control
8

of the property transferred after the transfer.
c„

That efforts were made to conceal the transfers

through use of "levels'1 of transferees.
d.

That before

the

transfers

had

been made the

debtor/Defendant Dwane Sykes had been sued or threatened with suit,
or reasonably could expect a suit would be forthcoming.
e. The overall transfers and property conveyed amount to
substantially all of the Defendant Dwane Sykes assets.
f.

That Defendant Dwane Sykes was insolvent or became

insolvent shortly after the transfers were made.

20.

That Plaintiff, by virtue of all the foregoing is

entitled to an avoidance of the transfers as described or referred
to herein or in any way relating to the properties set forth
herein, to the extent necessary to satisfy Plaintiff's claim of
judgment agaisnt Defendant Dwane Sykes as set forth herein.
Also, to an attachment or other provisional remedy against the
asset transferred or other property of the respective transferee
thereto in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure,
including the right to levy and execute on the same.
Also, for the issuance of an injunction against further
disposition by the debotr/Defendant Dwane Sykes or a transferee, or
both, of the asset transferred or of other property.
And also, for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of
the assset or assetts transferred or of other property of the
respective transferee involved.
9

21.

That the former wife of Defendant Dwane Sykes was

involved in some of the transactions described above, but on
information and belief Plaintiff alleges that through her divorce
settlement of January, 1996, she has given up claim of interest in
any of the properties described herein, or in the alternative that
her interst therein if any should be subordinated to the claim of
Plaintiff herein.
22 • That Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs and fees
incurred herein as may be found reasonable and appropriate by the
Court*

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:

1. For an Order of avoidance of the transfers as described or
referred to herein or in any way relating to the properties set
forth herein, to the extent necessary to satisfy Plaintiff's claim
of judgment agaisnt Defendant Dwane Sykes as set forth herein,
which judgment balance

is at least $135,000.00 plus accrued

interest, (the original judgment was much larger but reduced later
by the court, which reduction is presently on appeal and may
ultimately therefore, be much larger.)
2.

For an Order of attachment or other provisional remedy

against the asset transferred or other property of the respective
transferee thereto in accordance with applicable rules of civil
procedure, including the right to levy and execute on the same.
3. For an Order of injunction against further disposition by
10

the debotr/Defendant Dwane Sykes or a transferee, or both, of the
asset transferred or of other property4.

For an Order of appointment of a receiver to take charge

of the assset or assetts transferred or of other property of the
respective transferee involved.
5. For an Order declaring Patricia Sykes to have no interest
in the claimed fraudulently conveyed properties superior to the
claim of Plaintiff herein6.

For judgment against Defendant Dwane Sykes for costs

incurred herein and reasonable attorney fees where applicable and
also against any other defendants wrongfully found to be contesting
the claims of Plaintiff herein. As to Defendants Dennis Sykes and
Patricia Sykes, this Plaintiff seeks no monetary

damages or

judgment due to settlement reached with these parties after entry
of judgment in the case # 810457127 as set forth above.

Said

defendants have been named for declaratory purposes only to
ascertain rights as to the alleged fraudulently conveyed properties
and to establish where necessary the chain of wrongful conveyances.
7.

For such other and further relief as the court may find

just and appropriate in the premises.
DATED this o? /'day of August, 1996.

Ralph C. Amott, Atty. for
Plaintiff Hatch
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
11

Amended Complaint by Plaintiff

was mailed, postage prepaid, this

^?1 day of August, 1996, to the following:

Clark R. Nielsen
HENRIOD & NIELSEN
1160 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004
Attorney for Dennis L. Sykes

Dwane Sykes
1511 So. Carterville Rd.
Orem, UT 84057

Gordon Duval
Duval, Hansen Witt & Morley, L.L.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Attorney for Johnny Iverson
R. Kent Ludlow
NIELSEN & SENIOR
P.O, Box 11808
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Attorney for Taraangs
Max Ferre
1973 East 2400 North
Layton, Utah 84004
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SamPrimavera (5413)
Attorney for William Christiansen
746 E. 3800 N.
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 226-0993
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HOWARD E HATCH
Plaintiff

MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS
AGAINST WILLIAM CHRISTIANSEN
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

v.
DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L. SYKES,
WILLIAM CHRISTIANSEN,
ET.AL.

Defendants.

Civil No. 950 400 719 CV
Honorable Don J. Eyre

Date: 21 November 1996

Defendant William Chiistiansen through his attorney Sam Primavera files this motion
to dismiss claims against William Christiansen. Pursuant to U.R.CP. 12(b)(6) William
Christiansen asks the court to dismiss all claims against him inasmuch as such claims are
barred by the doctrine of Res judicata.
FACTS
1) Over 15 years ago multiple claims (cases 57,125 63,695 & 57,127) were initiated in which
inter aha a claim was brought against William Christiansen by Howard Hatch alleging that Mr.
Chiistiansen had purchased property at trustee's sale in collusion with Zions bank and other
defendants including Dwane Sykes.

2) Howard Hatch alleged in that complaint that Mr. Christiansen was the "strawman purchaser"
of property which Mr, Christiansen was actually purchasing for and in behalf of Mr. Dwane
Sykes.
3) The case dragged on for years.
4) On April 17 1991 Judge Mower signed an order disposing of the case as it pertains to Mr.
Christiansen.
5) Judge Mower's April 17 1991 order states "Defendant Christiansen has asked the Court to
dismiss any claims against him and to award him some attorney's fees. The court intends to
grant the requests. First I will analyze the situation in light of the motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS IN RE MOTION TO DISMISS One of the claims in case number 63,695 was for
damages against Zions Bank arising out of a trustee's sale conducted many years ago. Mr.
Christiansen was the successful bidder at that sale. Plaintiffs claim was that the sale, where
their property had been sold, had been improperly announced or scheduled and improperly
conducted. "Improperly" may be too weak a word to describe plaintiffs claims - they said that
the bank and Mr. Christiansen and other defendants conspired together to schedule and to
conduct an illegal sale"
6) The sale described in Judge Mowers order is exactly the same sale as the transaction
referred to in paragraph 12 of Mr. Hatch's amended complaint in this case.
7) The April 17 1991 dismissal by Judge Mower was upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals.
8) Shortly before 5 July 1995 Mr. Hatch again initiated an action against Mr, Christiansen in
which Mr. Hatch attempted to sell Mr. Christiansen's property at sheriffs sale claiming it was
Mr. Sykes' property.
9) Judge Mower again heard the case and ruled on 7 August 1995 that the sale of Mr.

Christiansen property was not supported by the requisite order of the court.
10) Judge Mower also ruled that "Any reopening of the question of whether Mr. William
Christiansen was the "strawman" of Mr. Sykes under the facts of this case [identical to the
instant facts] is barred by the doctrine of "res judicata", inasmuch as this issue was dealt with
in a prior order which was subsequently upheld on appeal."
11) Judge Mower in the same order granted an award of attorney's fees due to the "frivolous"
and improper procedures followed by Mr, Hatch.
12) Both of the awards of attorney's fees had to be collected by attachment from Mr. Hatch.
Neither was paid voluntarily.
13) Now Mr. Hatch has filed another claim using the identical facts of the previous two cases.
14) The events complained of occurred more than 10 years ago.

ARGUMENT
Under ILR.C.P. Rule 13(a)
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against an opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim"
All claims that Mr. Hatch had were decided in the prior adjudication or are precluded
under these rules or under the common law doctrine of res judicata- The prior case was the
exact same facts as the facts of the instant complaint. The complaint is also the same. Mr.
Hatch is claiming that Mr. Sykes is a "strawman purchaser". He is claiming that the property
was actually purchased by Mr. Christiansen for and in behalf of Mr. Christiansen This is
exactly the same claim and exactly the same set as facts as have been dealt with twice before

by Judge Mower. At some point this dispute needs to be put to rest Mr. Hatch is simply
harassing Mr. Christiansen and trying to reverse a decision that he has already lost
Under U.CU Sec, 78-12-6 No action founded upon title to real estate shall be valid if
the owner of the real estate has held the property for 7 or more years. The events in this action
are over 15 years old. There is no longer any valid action that may be commenced based upon
those actions.
CONCLUSION
The old saw that the third time is the charm does not apply in matters of repetitive
litigation. The issue presented to the court has already been adjudicated twice. In both cases
attorney's fees were awarded for tbe misdeeds of Mr. Hatch, Not only does this waste Mr.
Christiansen's time, energy and money, it is wasting die time of the court and perverting the
judicial process. Law suits may be fun and a sort of hobby for Mr. Hatch. But, they are not fun
for Mr, Christiansen. Mr. Christiansen asks for an order dismissing all claims against him as
res judicata and precluded by the statute of limitations and for an award of attorney's fees to
he established by affidavit.

SamPrimavera
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4r(s DISTRICT COURT
STATE OP 'iT/Ui
UTAH OOCHTY

RALPH C- AMOTT (#68)
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 377-6575
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
*
*

HOWARD F. HATCH,
Plaintiff,

*
*

vs.

*

DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L.
*
SYKES, BENOY & ANGELA
TAMANG, Trustees of the so*
called "Irrevocable Trust
Agreement", aka "THE DWAYNE
*
SYKES AND PATRICIA SYKES
*
CHILDRENS1 TRUST AND/OR THE
*
DWAYNE AND PATRICIA SYKES TRUST,*
JOHNNY M. IVERSON, MAX FERRE,
*
J- Glade Dursteller, James
*
Sauers, Patricia Sykes, William *
Christiansen,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
REPLY TO CHRISTIANSEN
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
COUNTERCLAIM; AND
PLAINITFF'S MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL AND/OR REMOVAL
CHRISTIANSEN AS A NAMED
PARTY DEFENDANT

CIVIL No.

950400719CV

Defendants.
Counterclaimant.
*

oooOooo
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through his attorney Ralph C.
Amott, and responds and replies to the motion to dismiss and
counterclaim filed by William Christiansen herein.

Plaintiff

objects to the claims made by Christiansen and to the request for
damages which is unfounded and inequitable.

Christiansen's

request is premature in that he has not been served in this matter

1

in any fashion.
1.

Plaintiff specifically responds as follows;

It is true that Plaintiff and Defendant Dwane Sykes have

been engaged in ongoing litigation for many years, both usually
acting Pro Se. Plaintiff finally obtained a large judgment against
Defendant Dwane Sykes in February of 1995.

The present case was

instituted by Plaintiff, again pro se, alleging valid claims of
fraudulent conveyance by Mr. Sykes that have made it nearly
impossible for creditors to rightfully pursue lawful collection
remedies against Mr. Sykes.
2.

The original complaint filed by Plaintiff listed several

parties as co-defendants who were thought to be involved in the
chain of title of some of these allegedly fraudulently conveyed
properties. Mr. Christansen herein was not one of the originally
listed defendants. Mr- Hatch also filed a request for the right to
amend his complaint shortly after he filed it in 1995.
At this point Mr. Hatch was unexpectedly called on a mission
for the LDS Church with his wife to Germany. They left in April of
1996 and shortly before his leaving he contacted my office for
representation help and left a number of documents with me.

In

August of this year, one of the Defendants filed a motion with the
court asking that Plaintiff amend his complaint per his pro se
motion of many months earlier-

As counsel for Plaintiffr Mr.

Amott had not requested that an amended complaint be filed at that
time and in fact objected to the request that Plaintiff be forced
to amend his complaint right at that time inasmuch as Mr. Amott was
still attempting to sift through the voluminous documents in this
2

matter and determine the relevant issues. An effort complicated by
Plaintiff Hatch's being in Germany-

Mr. Amott's request for

additional time before an amended complaint was filed was denied by
the court and he was instructed to file an amended complaint within
20 days3,

Pursuant to this request, an amended complaint was

prepared.

Communication with Plaintiff Hatch has and continues to

be difficult because of his being in Germany.
amended

complaint/

counsel Amott

In preparing the

for Plaintiff

reviewed

all

documents presently in his possession to determine how best to
flesh out the applicable issues. Three potential defendants were
identified from that review of documents and added as defendants,
namely Dursteller/ Sauer and Christiansen*

In order to meet the

court's deadline for the amended complaint and still preserve my
client's rights as to other possible defendants these names were
added to the amended complaint as parties having dealings with
property of Mr. Sykes that were at issue here.

At the time of

preparing the amended complaint. Counsel Amott had not seen or been
informed by anyone of the prior rulings in other cases regarding
Mr* Christiansen and Mr. Hatch and was unaware of them till copies
were received with Christiansen's Motion to Dismiss.
4. Of key importance here is the fact that though a few more
defendants were named to preserve the right to have them involved
if necessary at a later date, none of the three additional parties,
including Mr» Christiansen herein, was served with the amended
complaint nor was any attempt made to serve hinu
3

Counsel Amott

wished to further investigate the complexities of this case so that
matters such as have been raised by Mr. Christiansen as to prior
orders or rulings could be fully examined.

It is unfortunate in

the extreme in that regard that Counsel for Mr. Christiansen did
not see fit to privately inform counsel for Plaintiff of these
earlier rulings. A simple call or letter would have resolved the
matter

completely-

Instead

he

chose

counterclaims without Mr. Christiansen

to

file motions

and

even being served in an

attempt to paint an unduly harsh and unfair picture and apparently
in the hopes of reaping some huge damage windfall-

At the very

least it appears as an attempt to chill Plaintiff's rights or
ability to proceed in the case in chief which is suspect inasmuch
as on information and belief it is believed by Plaintiff that
Counsel Primavera for Mr, Christiansen has in the past represented
Mr. Dwane Sykes who is the primary target of this lawsuit, and that
he is very familiar with Mr. Sykes and his situation*
5his

Based on the documents supplied by Mr. Christiansen with

motion,

Plaintiff

has

no

problem

with

the

idea

that

Christiansen should not be served in this matter and that if
necessary his name may be removed from the heading of the amended
complaint.
supplied

by

possibility-

If he is needed as a witness, the prior rulings
Christiansen

would

not

seem

to

prevent

that

Inasmuch as Christiansen was and is not served, a

motion to dismiss and counterclaim and answer seem premature and
unnecessary and not the proper avenue to follow if what is wanted
is to have his name removed from the heading of the case. Again,
4

Plaintiff will stipulate to that removal6*

As

to

Christainsen's

counterclaim,

its

effect

is

questionable inasmuch as he is unserved, but to protect Plaintiff's
interests herein, Plaintiff hereby denies all allegations of
Christiansen's counterclaim, including but not limited to the
specific allegations of abuse of process, harrassment, invasion of
privacy and Rule 11 violations7. The law is clear that until a party is served with process
this court has no jurisdiction over Mr. Christiansen. Therefore no
relief even remotely adverse to Mr. Christiansen could be sought by
Plaintiff, or any plaintiff, till he was served- Therefore all the
claims of Christiansen of abuse of process, harassment, malicious
prsecutions, e t c , would seem to be manufactured claims based on
what has gone on so far.
8-

Plaintiff herein, in his own right, moves this court for

an order removing the name of William Christiansen from the heading
of the case, and if necessary because of the voluntary answer filed
by Christiansen, that the matter be dismissed as to hinu
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that the claims set
forth in Christiansen's counterclaim be denied as unfounded and
premature and grant Plaintiff's stipulated agreement herein to
remove Mr. Christiansen as a party defendant (unserved) based on
the documents from an earlier case provided with their pleadings.
Plaintiff also requests that no damages or fees be awarded in this
matter inasmuch as any error committed was inadvertant and without
actual knowledge of the particulars set forth by Christiansen in
5

his pleadings and have been blown out of proportion when a much
less

costly

route

could

have been pursued

to resolve this

misunderstandingDATED this j V day of November, 1996.

Ralph C, Amott, Atty- for
Plaintiff Hatch

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Plaintiff's Verified Response and Reply to Christiansen1 s Motion to
dismiss and Counterclaim, and Motion for removal and/or Dismissal
of William Christiansen as a Named Party Defendant,

was mailed,

postage prepaid, this D jTday of November, 1996, to the following:
Sam Primavera, Attorney for Christiansen, 746 East 3800 North,
Provo, UT 84604-
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FILED
pptrrtfc Judicial Distfto $oM\
(BfrUjah County, Stalest U\3)W/

Sam Primavera (5413)
Attorney for William Christiansen
746E. 3800 N.
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 226-0993

V

CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk

\

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HOWARD F. HATCH
Plaintiff

ORDER FOR DISMISSAL OF
CLAIMS AGAINST WILLIAM
CHRISTIANSEN

v.
DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L. SYKES,
WILLIAM CHRISTIANSEN,
ET. AL.

Civil No. 950 400 719 CV
Honorable Don J. Eyre

Defendants.

The Court having reviewed the applicable documents and considered all arguments
presented, makes the following judgement and order:

1) The claims made by Mr. Hatch in the instant case against William Christiansen are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by the applicable statute of Limitation.

2) The actions by Mr. Hatch in prosecuting this claim, yet a third time, were frivolous
and constitute harassment of William Christiansen.

3) Any and all claims against William Christiansen in this case and related to the instant
set of facts are dismissed with prejudice and Mr. Hatch is ordered not to again bring
such a case against Mr. Christiansen under penalty of afindingof contempt

4) Attorney's fees and all costs incurred are awarded to Mr. Christiansen in an amount
to be established by affidavit of Mr, Primavera.

5) The Court reserves the right to award Rule 11 sanctions until judgement is rendered
on Mr. Christiansen's counter-claim.
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Sam Primavera (5413)
Attorney for William Christiansen
746 E. 3800 N.
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone.' (801) 861-4551

JUDGMENT

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD F. HATCH

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiff

v.
DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L. SYKES,.
WILLIAM CHRISTIANSEN,
ET. AL.

Civil No. 950 400 719 CV

f)\)J\n\Yi(\k^

Defendants.

Judge Eyre has previous ruled in a motion for summary judgment in this case that
Howard Hatch had committed an abuse of civil process but had reserved the award of damages
for trial The case came on for trial before a jury on the 20th and 21st of October 1999. The
jury found that Mr, Christiansen had been damaged by Mr. Hatch and awarded Mr.
Christiansen $1,000 in compensatory damages. Therefore:
1) It is ordered that Mr. Hatch pay to Mr. Christiansen $1,000 (one thousand dollars) in
compensatory damages,
2) Statutory interest will accrue beginning on the date that this judgment and order is
1

signed.
3) This award shall be augmented by any and all costs of collection, including but not
limited to attorney's fees.

7-7-?9
Date

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the judgment and order was sent first class postage
prepaid on ? 0 day of
/(^«
19 ^ Q
to:
Ralph C. Amott
60 E. 100 S. Ste 102
Provo, UT 84606
Fourth District Court
125 N. 100 W.
Provo, UT 84601

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the fQ day of January, 2005 I caused to be delivered via the following
method two copies of the foregoing to the following:
Spencer F. Hatch
1433LakeviewDr.,#100
Bountiful, Utah 84010

/}
D
D
•

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express
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